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-iABSTRACT
This research argues that in order to operate successfully a Natural Resource Fund
(NRF), no matter what its goals are, must be transparent, accountable and open for public
scrutiny. Otherwise, a NRF could be useless or even harmful. “Resource curse,” “Dutch
disease,” and “rentier” behavior are theoretical rationales for establishing NRFs.
Corruption is viewed as a “transmission channel” of natural resource effects on growth.
Guidelines to evaluate NRFs for transparency and accountability were developed.
Analysis of selected NRFs’ websites revealed that Norway and Alaska provide directions
to incorporate transparency into a NRF. Alberta demonstrates that even if democracy is
strong, a lack of transparency and accountability decreases effectiveness of a NRF.
Venezuela and Kazakhstan demonstrate a fragility of a NRF when bureaucratic elites
keep a NRF from public oversight. Azerbaijan shows that steady disclosure efforts can
improve a NRF’s performance, though not by much if public involvement is low.
A variety of mistakes were made in designing the Russian Stabilization Fund: in
predicting oil market dynamics and, consequently, in setting the threshold and base prices
of oil. The lack of proper legislation and checks and balances blocked a chance to fix
these mistakes early on. The research concludes with policy recommendations for the
government of Russia: to clarify the Fund’s mission, to strengthen its legal foundation, to
diversify its investment strategy, to establish an auditing policy, to create an overseeing
public council, to disclose quarterly and annual reports, to maintain a website, and other
improvements.
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-11. INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
In the last 30 years a variety of Natural Resource Funds (NRFs) were created in
different resource-rich countries and territories to help manage their natural resource
wealth. NRFs have a variety of forms, ranging from separate institutions to little more
that a governmental account. These funds have been expected, through stabilization of
fiscal policy and savings of a portion of revenues in their countries, to tackle such
negative effects of revenues from natural resources as exploding or volatility of prices,
“Dutch Disease” and “Paradox of Plenty.” The funds have also been expected to promote
good governance in managing of natural resource endowments through transparency and
public accountability of their operations.
In their years of operation it has become evident that the effectiveness of the
NRFs as a fiscal policy instrument is mixed, and resource-abundant countries can
implement sound fiscal policy just as effectively without a NRF as with one (Davis and
others 2001). Some scholars believe that a real value of a NRF is to be a political
instrument, especially in new democracies and non-democratic states, that forces
governments to be honest about what they are earning and spending.
Natural Resource Funds around the world differ from each other in goals,
objectives, organizational structures, and spending patterns. In this paper we do not argue
the efficacy of different functions of a NRF. Instead, we suggest that a NFR can be
viewed as a complex policy institution that can serve as an instrument of fiscal, financial,
social and developmental policies, with substantial political influence. An argument of

-2this paper is that in order to be successful in any of these functions, a NRF must be
transparent, accountable, and open for public participation.
Theoretical Framework
Fundamental postulates of democratic governance serve as theoretical bases for
this research in general. Access to information and accountability are necessary
conditions for effective performance of any financial institution in a market economy.
Political institutions in a democratic society do not work without separation of powers,
checks and balances, publicity, and freedom of expression. In particular, “resource
curse,” “paradox of plenty,” “Dutch disease” and “rentier” behavior will be viewed as
theoretical rationales for establishing NRFs.
Special theoretical attention will be paid to the relationship between abundant
natural resources and corruption. Some scholars argue that abundant natural resources
stimulate the development of corruption. Oil-exporting countries, according to
Transparency International’s World Corruption Index, are considered especially corrupt.
Moreover, Carlos Leite and Jens Weidermann found that corruption functions as a
“transmission channel of natural resource effects on growth” and, consequently,
exacerbates the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon (Leite and Weidermann 1999). Based on
this theoretical funding we can conclude that NRFs as instruments of public policy must
be transparent and accountable to tackle not only Dutch Disease, but corruption itself.
Only by being transparent and accountable can NRFs mitigate negative outcomes of the
“resource curse” associated with petroleum and other minerals. Without transparency, a
NRF could be useless or even have “adverse impacts” (Davis and other 2001:7).

-3Hypothesis, Variables and an Evaluation Tool
A Hypothesis is as follows: The more transparent, accountable, and open for
public governing any NRF is, the more likely this fund will perform effectively in terms
of revenues and public spending.
Independent variables: Transparency can be measured as the scope of information
about a fund’s operations presented in comprehensible language and available for the
broad public. Accountability can be viewed in terms of sound internal and external
auditing policies. Level of public participation can be observed through activities of
overseeing bodies, outcomes of related public hearings, and forums.
Dependent variables: The dynamics of a fund’s principal and returns on portfolio
are determinants of revenues. Addressing budget deficits, repaying foreign debts,
implementing social projects, and distributing dividends directly to citizens from NRFs
are indicators of a sound spending strategy.
For the purpose of measuring the independent variables, guidelines for Natural
Resource Funds were developed. These guidelines do not pretend to be exhaustive, but
they represent a policy tool created for the purpose of this evaluation based on analysis of
the literature.
However, because of restricted access to information about funds’ operations
around the world, the hypothesis is only tested to a limited extent. Strictly speaking, only
the level of transparency, as a scope of information presented on NRFs’ websites, is
evaluated directly for six selected NRFs. Accountability and public involvement are
checked indirectly, as availability of audit and overseeing bodies’ reports on funds’

-4websites. In addition, accountability lines are analyzed for two selected funds.
Independent variables of selected funds are taken from estimates by other scholars.
The primary source of data is official websites of selected NRFs and other
governmental and non-governmental agencies.
Narrow Scope of Analysis and Research Questions
The narrow scope of this research is the Stabilization Fund of the Russian
Federation, which was established in December 2003 by the legislature (Duma). The
launching of the Russian Fund reflects the government’s desire to achieve a greater
control over oil revenues compared with the preceding Yelsin period, when most
revenues ended up in the hands of a few oligarchs.1 Scholars are far from a consensus on
the advantages of establishing an oil fund in a country with questionable budget
discipline. Still, other scholars believe that this fund can help to establish some regularity
and predictability in the management of resource revenues in Russia. 2
The law set a base threshold for the overall amount accumulating in the Fund after
exceeding which the government has the right to withdraw money from the Fund. Within
just one year, this threshold was surpassed.
Calls for the “easy money” from the Fund have intensified in Russia these days.
Several major teams have formed around the issue of tapping money from the Fund.
Most regional governors have favored utilizing the oil money for various investment
projects. A business lobby has called for distributing funds in the form of developmental
loans. There are some exotic ideas as well. For example, one politician, Sergey Mironov,
suggested opening a personal account for each newborn in Russia with $10.000 on this
1

Russia’s Growing Dependence on Oil and Its Venture into a Stabilization Fund. Prepared by the Institute for

the Analysis of Global Security. http://www.iags.org/n0328052.htm.
2

Ibid.

-5account. A child would be able to take this money on reaching 18 years old. Until that
time, the money would be used for high-tech infrastructure development in Russia.3
In 2005, under the pressure of economists, led by Finance Minister Kudrin, some
of the fund’s money was spent for early repayment of Russia’s foreign debt and covering
a shortfall in the pension fund.
It appears that effectiveness of the Russian Stabilization Fund as a fiscal policy
and financial institution is mix. The Russian Account Chamber calculated that the Fund
did not earn, but lost in 2005 approximately $820 million because of inflation and a poor
investment strategy (Kipelman 2005:71).
At first glance, the level of transparency and accountability is very low. If this
situation continues there will be a risk that the Russian Fund will become a secret account
for the Russian elite’s private spending.
In this connection, the first research question is: why did all this happen with the
Russian Fund? If the hypothesis is right the second research question will be: What
should be done in Russia to increase fiscal transparency, public accountability and
participation in managing the Russian Stabilization Fund. Major policy recommendations
will be elaborated for the Russian government. Some of them will be interesting for
foreign governments and international organizations dealing with natural resources in
Russia.
As for the structure of the thesis, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework.
Chapter 3 is devoted to analysis of NFRs’ practices to test the hypothesis. The topic of
Chapter 4 is current developments with the stabilization fund in Russia and policy
recommendations.
3

http://www.mironov.ru/Position/18275.html.

-62. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCE FUNDS

The purpose of this chapter is to prove theoretically that transparency,
accountability and public participation are necessary conditions for any Natural Resource
Fund (NRF) to operate successfully as an institution for managing public natural resource
wealth. However, they are definitely not sufficient conditions by themselves. Efficient
functioning of any NRF depends on many other factors that mostly relate to strict fiscal
policy and effective financial performance by a team of professional investors with a
fund’s money on the world financial market. An effective spending strategy is equally
important as earnings. However, the key point of this thesis is that NRFs must be
accountable and open for public scrutiny.

Without this, even a perfect financial

performance of NRFs will not help people of resource-abundant countries to prevent
benefits from their natural resource endowments from being spent ineffectively or from
flowing to the private accounts of top bureaucrats.

2.1. “Resource Curse” as a Rationale for Establishing Natural Resource Funds
Negative development outcomes associated with petroleum and other minerals are
known as the “resource curse.” This is the phrase used primarily by economists (Gelb
1988; Auty 1997; and Sachs and Warner 1995). Auty (1997) found that the Asian
“tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and others), which are poor in
natural resources, grew four times more rapidly than resource-rich Latin America and
African countries between1970 and1993, despite the fact that the “tigers” had half the
savings. This phenomenon became known as the “resource curse” hypothesis (Auty and
Mikesell 1998:6). A comprehensive study by Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs and

-7Andres Warner demonstrates that countries whose natural resource exports composed a
high percentage of gross domestic products had abnormally slow growth rates between
1971 and 1989 when compared to non-resource-based development models, drawing on
data from 97 developing countries. The negative relationship holds true even after
controlling for many variables found to be important for economic growth by previous
authors (1995:2). The greater the dependence on oil and mineral resources, the worse the
growth performance, a finding that has been confirmed by economists in the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (Leite and Weidermann 1999).
Another broadly acknowledged term to describe the gap between the promise of
natural resource wealth and the perversity of its performance is “paradox of plenty,” by
Terry Lynn Karl (1997). As Svetlana Tsalik (2003:1) mentioned in the Caspian Watch
study, such terminology as “Dutch Disease,” “flawed prosperity,” “economic
indigestion,” and even “the devil’s excrement”4 have been utilized to describe this
essential paradox: resource-abundant economies underperformed in almost every area of
progress ranging from human development, economic growth, democracy and good
governance, and preserving the peace.
From a policy perspective, while it is important to know if a curse exists, it is
perhaps more important to know the mechanism by which it casts its spell. Identifying
the mechanism of this curse allows for designing not only a policy to cure the problem,
but also a policy to prevent the problem.
From the broad literature review, the explanation for poor growth performance on
the part of resource-exporting countries can be roughly divided into two categories: the

4

This term was invented by former Venezuelan Oil Minister and OPEC co-founder Juan Pablo Perez.

-8economic effects and the institutional impact of natural resources. 5 Some authors label
these effects as direct and indirect (Leite and Weidmann 1999:8).
The main economic effects include the Dutch disease and volatility (Gelb and
Associates 1988; Hausmann and Rigobon 2002). The Dutch disease is the tendency for
the real exchange rate to become overly appreciated in response to positive shocks, which
leads to a contraction of the tradable non-resource sector (Sach and Warner 1995:6).
Natural resource ownership exposes countries to volatility, because the supply of natural
resources exhibits low price elasticities of supply (at least in the short term) (Hausmann
and Rigobon 2002:7). It means that oil price shocks do not follow relatively equal shifts
in the supply of oil to the world market. Thus, for countries where oil revenues represent
a significant percent of GDP, oil price shocks produce income shocks of GDPs which
influences investments and income distribution.6
The institutional approach focuses on governance issues such as rent-seeking,
corruption, and bloated public sectors (Karl 1997; Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 2003, and
others). In general, natural resources generate rents that leads to rapacious rent-seeking
(the voracity effect7), whose adverse manifestation is felt through a political economy
effect (Lane and Tornell 1997) and increased corruption (Mauro, 1995; and Leite and
Weidmann, 1999), which adversely affects long-run growth.8

5

This is a kind of sweeping generalization for the purpose of this thesis. Each author pretends to adopt
his/her own approach to explain the phenomenon of resource curse. For example, Terry Karl in his
Paradox of Plenty applied an “eclectic approach” as a combination of “sectoral, Marxist, dependency,
rational-choice, organizational, and staple theories without fully espousing any of them. (Karl 1997:xvii)”
6
For example, the standard deviation of oil price changes has been about 30 to 35 percent per year. For a
country where oil represents about 20 percent of GDP, a one-standard deviation shock to the price of oil
represents an income shock equivalent to 6 percent of GDP (Hausmann and Rigobon 2002:7).
7
“The “voracity effect” is the more than proportional increase in discretionary redistribution in response to
an increase in the row rate of returns in the “efficient sector,” in the Lane, P. and Tornell, A. (1997)
“Voracity and Growth.” Harvard Institute for Economic Research. Discussion Paper No. 1807, p. 15.
8
See more about a relationship between corruption and economic growth in 1.2.

-9In the most recently published article on the issue, Isham (2005:7) and others
conclude that the relationship between rich natural resource endowments and poor
development has been explained by two broad schools of thought: political science and
economics. The authors provide a thoughtful, clear summary of the mechanisms of
causation identified in economic and political science literature.
According to Isham and others, political scientists generally argue that certain
natural resources undermine democracy through what they term “rentier” effects
(2005:8). They based their analysis on Ross’s (2001) empirical investigation of
consequences when government can easily extract revenues from a few sources. First, the
state has less need for taxation, and citizens have less incentive to develop the civil
society that is a precondition for democracy.9 This frees resource-exporting governments
from the types of citizen demands for fiscal transparency and accountability that arise
when people pay taxes directly to the government. Second, with the exogenous revenues,
governments can “mollify dissent” by buying off critics and providing benefits for
particular groups of the population. Third, the state possesses resources to suppress
directly any ideas against the regime. The authors also argue that resource income
insulates governments from pressure for institutional reform because their “budgetary
revenues are derived from a small workforce that deploy sophisticated technical skills
that can only be acquired abroad.” (Isham and others:10)
According to Isham and others, economists usually explain the resource course
via two core mechanisms: Dutch disease and “entrenched inequality effect.”10

9

See, for example, {some other authors}: Lipset (1959), Moor (1966), and Inglehart (1997).
The “entrenched inequality” effect argues that divergent growth trajectories [in] South and North
America over the last two hundred years can be explained by reference to the types of crops grown, the

10

- 10 Isham and others argue that a combination of both these approaches into “a
political economy story” based on “social divisions effects” and “governance effects”
provides a more compelling explanation, at least for the divergent growth experience of
developing countries over the last forty years (2005:10).11 They further argue that certain
types of natural resources, such as “oil, diamonds, and plantation crops,” can be easily
captured by the elite–simultaneously exacerbating social tensions, weakening
institutional capacity, strengthening corruption, and thereby undermining the ability and
the willingness of governments to respond promptly to economic shocks.12 Thus,
abundant natural resources not only generate poor governance itself through rent-seeking
behavior; but poor governance and corruption function as the catalyst of slow
development because the government cannot react properly to the economic challenges
of natural endowments.
Taking into consideration the political economy approach, we can suggest that a
NRF could serve as a mechanism for alleviating a variety of negative outcomes of
resource abundance, such as social tensions, weakened institutional capacity and
economic shock.
The primary goal of NRFs in many countries is to soften negative macroeconomic
outcomes: Dutch disease and volatility through stabilization of fiscal policy from swings
in resource revenues, and savings for future generations. A strong and transparent
governance climate is an essential underpinning for such revenue management. Without

extent of property rights regimes enacted to secure their sales and the timing and the nature of colonization
(see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).
11
Many other scholars advocate a political economy approach when studying any oil related topic, and
exclude geological issues. For example, Claes used a political economy approach to study the oil-producer
cooperation (Claes 2001: 366).
12
Ibid, p.10.

- 11 proper publicity and a strict budget discipline, the financial performance of any resource
fund cannot be successful because there is always a temptation for a government to spend
“easy money” according to political, but not economic reasons.
To alleviate social tensions and create trust between governments and citizens, a
NRF could serve as an open public policy institute. Political leaders need to regard their
country’s natural resources as national endowments, and provide transparency and public
participation in managing these endowments for their citizens because these resources do
not belong exclusively to the current government or generation, but to all citizens and
generations. As Joseph E. Stiglitz stated, “To use these resources for one’s own benefit,
leaving future generations impoverished, is to steal their patrimony.”13 Turning oil
revenues into long-term benefits for a state’s people ultimately depends on the quality of
public policy. As Karl and Gary (2004:4) perfectly mentioned, “given the right incentives
for making good policy choices, petroleum revenues can be “black gold” rather than “the
excrement of the devil.”
Under ideal conditions a NRF can force governments to plan ahead and to be
transparent about what they are earning and spending, thus strengthening governance and
fighting corruption. By providing information to legislatures and citizens about how oil,
gas and other minerals are being managed, a NRF can encourage another key component
of good revenue management: an educated and active citizenry capable of organizing to
demand accountability for government expenditures. Thus, a NRF can also help to
develop and strengthen democracy.

13

In the volume: Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? Caspian Revenue Watch. Open Society
Institute. Central Eurasia Project, p. xi.

- 12 From this theoretical analysis we can conclude that a NFR, as a policy instrument,
can help not only to fight the negative outcomes of the resource curse, but can also help
to manage natural resource endowments in the interests of all people. To achieve these
policy objectives, a NRF should be transparent, accountable and open for public
oversight and participation.
However, there is a more deep and threatening correlation between abundant
natural resources, corruption, and poor economic performance. Abundant resources not
only generate corruption themselves through rent-seeking behavior, but the corruption
originating from the resource wealth worsens significantly the negative economic
outcomes. The following section sets forth undeniably relevant theoretical and empirical
evidence that transparency and accountability are basic initial conditions necessary for
operating any NRF. Experience has taught that absent transparency and accountability,
these funds will likely exacerbate the resource curse’s negative effects.

2.2 Corruption as a “Transmission Channel” for the Negative Effects of Natural
Resources on Growth
The causes and consequences of corruption have received increasing attention
from social scientists over the past ten years. As Tanzi argues (2002:19), this is partly
because the phenomenon of corruption, itself, has been on the increase these last two
decades due to the increased role of governments in internal and external economic
relations.

Part of the reason for the increasing interest in corruption is the new

availability of cross-national data from corruption surveys that began in the beginning of
the 1980s, specifically under the premises of the International Country Risk Group

- 13 (ICRG)14 and then Transparency International.15 Also, no doubt, the greater freedom of
the press in former communist countries has increased public perceptions and awareness
of corruption in recent years.
Although there is no universal or comprehensive definition as to what constitutes
corrupt behavior, the most prominent definitions share a common emphasis upon the
abuse of public power or position for personal advantage or gain.16
In a pioneering econometric study of corruption, Mauro (1995) emphasizes that
corruption may constitute a significant obstacle to investments. The other two studies on
the role of investment focus on particular components: Wei (1997) on foreign direct
investment, and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) on public investments.17 Neither Wei (1997)
nor Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) estimate the subsequent impact of corruption on growth.
The only econometric evidence of a direct effect of corruption on growth is provided by
Poison (1998) and Rama (1993).18

14

Since 1980, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) evaluates economic, political and financial risk
and warn of major changes in more than 100 countries. http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html.
15
Transparency International (TI) is the leading global non-governmental organization devoted to
combating corruption. Its mission is to create change towards a world free of corruption. TI was
established in 1993. http://ww1.transparency.org/index.html.
16
The succinct definition utilized by the World Bank is “the abuse of public office for private gain.” This
definition is similar to that employed by TI. See World Bank 1997, p. 8. See also Transparency
International. 1996. The TI Sourcebook, edited by Jeremy Pope. Berlin: TI, p.1. The World Bank definition
includes the activities of private agents who subvert public policies and processes for competitive
advantage.
17
Wei (1997) uses individual survey responses to construct a measure of corruption-induced uncertainty.
He found that the uncertainty associated with corruption reduces foreign direct investments. Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) provide cross-sectional evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower quality of
public infrastructure.
18
Poison (1998) analyzes the effect of economic security on 53 countries over the period 1984-95. In the
context of a growth equation, this study includes measures on investment, openness and corruption as
exogenous variables, and finds that corruption significantly reduces economic growth rates. Rama (1993)
endogenizes lobbying costs incurred by the firm. Using data for Uruguay over the period 1947-98, and
regressing long-run growth rates on sectoral and aggregate investment rates, this study finds that lagged
values of restrictive regulations decrease growth at the aggregate level.

- 14 There are very few studies directly reflecting the impact of abundant natural
resources on corruption. The problem arises from the possible impact of windfall gains
on rent-seeking behavior. Khan (1994), for example, attributes the pervasiveness of
corruption in Nigeria to the oil boom. Lane and Tornell (1997) point out that trade
windfall gains may cause a “feeding frenzy” in which competing groups fight for the
natural resource rents, thereby inefficiently exhausting the public good. Lane and Tornell
based their empirical research on three countries’ windfall experiences during the period
of high oil prices between 1974 and 1986, Nigeria, Venezuela and Mexico (22).
Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann (1999), in their famous paper “Does Mother
Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption and Economic Growth,” investigate the
two main causality lines: the determinants of corruption with a special emphasis on the
role of natural resource abundance, and the growth effects of corruption. Both issues
were studied theoretically, within a general equilibrium framework, as well as
empirically within a simultaneous equation model with both economic growth and
corruption endogenized (3).
As a measure of corruption, they use the ICRG corruption index. The index is
scored on a scale of 0-6, with lower scores indicating that “high government officials are
likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected
throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.” (Leite
and Weidmann 1999:17). The data on natural resource exports as a share of GDP are
originally taken from Sachs and Warner (1995).19

19

They include into the regression equation also such independent variables as “trade openness”, “rule of
law” and “political instability” as the rent-seeking literature suggests (19).

- 15 Their two main empirical results support their initial hypothesis of the corruption
channel’s being an important explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich countries:
first, “capital intensive natural resources are a major determinant of corruption”; second,
corruption lowers economic growth. Another interesting empirical result is that neither
the corruption nor the growth is different in Africa than elsewhere (Leite and Weidmann
1999:30). Thus, this result denies the proposition about cultural roots of corruption.
Analytically, Leite and Weidmann (1999) focus on effects of two instruments of
anti-corruption policies: improvements in monitoring technology versus increases in
penalties. They found that institution building (improvements in monitoring technology)
tends to be more effective in less developed countries, while stricter enforcement
(increases in penalties) is predicted to be more effective in more developed countries.20
As a remedy, Leite and Weidmann (1999) stress the importance of strong
institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries as a way to curb the associated
negative growth effects of corruption (31). This is especially true in less developed
countries, where natural resource booms and busts have a much higher relative impact on
both the capital stocks and the extent of corruption, and confront generally weaker and
less adaptable institutions. We can interpret their results as follows: ceteris paribus,21 a
resource-abundant country would generate corruption more rapidly than another country
without natural resources wealth.
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Ibid, 30.
A Latin phrase, literally translated as “with other things [being] the same.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceteris_paribus.
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- 16 The Transparency International’s World Corruption Index supports this
proposition.22 In 2005, totally159 of the world's countries are included in the survey. The
scores range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A score of 5.0 is the
number Transparency International considers the borderline figure distinguishing
countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem. According to this survey,
only Norway, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have corruption index higher than 5.0
among countries with net exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day (Table 1). Other
main net exporting countries have serious corruption problems. Such less developed oilexporting countries as Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, Libya, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are
considered especially corrupt with an index less than 3.0. Russia had a score of 2.4 in
2005 that indicates a high level of corruption.
Table 1. The Level of Corruption Among the Top World Oil Net Exporters
Country

Net
Oil
Exports Country Order Corruption
Perception
(million
barrels/day) Rank
of Index 2005
2004*
Corruption
1. Saudi Arabia
8.73
70
3.4
2. Russia
6.67
126
2.4
3. Norway
2.91
8
8.9
4. Iran
2.55
88
2.9
5. Venezuela
2.36
130
2.3
6. United Arab Emirates
2.33
30
6.2
7. Kuwait
2.20
45
4.7
8. Nigeria
2.19
152
1.9
9. Mexico
1.80
65
3.5
10. Algeria
1.68
97
2.8
11. Iraq
1.48
137
2.2
12. Libya
1.34
117
2.5
13. Kazakhstan
1.06
107
2.6
14. Qatar
1.02
32
5.9
15. Azerbaijan
0.319
137
2.2
*Table includes all countries with net exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day in 2004 excluding
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan produces less than 1 million barrels/day. However, we included Azerbaijan for the
purpose of this research.
Source: 1. Energy Information Administration. The US Government. Non-OPEC Fact Sheet. 2004.
2. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. 2005. Transparency
International.
22

It is a composite index, drawing on 16 surveys from 10 independent institutions, which gathered the
opinions of businesspeople and country analysts. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html.

- 17 There are a significant number of grandiose “white elephant” projects in which
countries, characterized by enormous corruption in awarding import quotas, industrial
licenses, and trade franchises: low-cost credits become the normal way of doing
business.23
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the external policy environment contributes to
overly centralized power and rent-seeking of oil-producing countries’ governments by
outsiders’ pursuit of oil there. The global oil corporations, because of their tremendous
power and strength, act sometimes with complete disdain for local norms and regulations,
bribing the governments (Levenstein and Wooding 2005). The global oil companies
manipulate existing laws and create new laws in their own interest (Karl 1997). For
business people it is more effective to deal with mono-powerful local elite than with a
democratic polity. International financial institutions also support resource’s perverse
development cycle by routinely encouraging development strategies based on the
“resource comparative advantage.”
The classic weapons for fighting corruption are “checks and balances,” budget
transparency and public participation in policy-making. If the government of a resourceabundant country is not accountable, business lacks transparency, the economy is weak
and public participation absent; then rent-seeking and corruption will likely result. In this
case, easy petrodollars will continue to pour without restrictions, according to political
and personal preferences of local elites, limiting the resources for economic growth.
Governments of resource-rich countries should pay particular attention to “checks
and balances” issues when creating new policies and institutions, because a resource-rich
23

Examples abound: a mountain-top resort in Venezuela, the largest airport in Saudi Arabia, a man-made
river in Libya, the Trans-Railway in Gabon, and a new capital city, Abuja, in Nigeria (Karl and Gary
2004:2).

- 18 country will more likely generate corruption more rapidly than a resource-poor country
with similar politico-economic characteristics.
If a government of any resource-abundant country, especially a less developed
one is considering establishing a NRF as a response to its hydrocarbon booms and busts,
the first question should be: to what extent will the design of this fund ensure
transparency, accountability and public participation in the management of the natural
resource endowments. Otherwise, the fund, filled with “oil rent,” will likely contribute to
“rentier” behavior of the top bureaucracy and to corruption, even if it performs
effectively as a financial institution.
2.3. A Properly Designed Natural Resource Fund as a Policy Instrument to Manage
Resource Wealth
There is no generic term for funds of natural resources. Some authors commonly
use the abbreviation “NFR,” but decode it differently. For example, Davis, Ossowski,
Daniel, and Barnett (2003:273) mean “nonrenewable resource fund” when using this
abbreviation. The Caspian Watch analysts means “natural resource fund” when using the
same abbreviation (Tsalik 2003).24 Some authors clearly distinguish between the two
main types of NRFs, and label them either Stabilization Funds or Savings Funds (Fasano
2000). Some authors and policy makers specify the type of natural resource relevant for
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I prefer to use the term “natural resource fund” for this thesis because it is simpler than “nonrenewable
resource fund”. However, I admit that “nonrenewable resource fund” reflects better the bottom line of the
phenomenon.

- 19 a particular country, when giving the title for a specific fund.25 And there are other
variations in their titles.26
There is no one broadly accepted definition of a Natural Resource Fund either.
This thesis employs the definition by the Caspian Watch analysts. They define NFRs as
“a mechanism that some countries have adopted to address the principal challenge facing
by budgets dependent to a great extent on revenues from the export of natural resources.”
(Tsalik 2003:18). The general justification for such funds is that some share of
government revenues derived from the exploitation and export of nonrenewable resources
should be put aside for the time these revenues decline, because the price has fallen, the
resource has been depleted, or both (Davis and others 2003:273-274). A stabilization
fund is designed to stabilize revenue flows and expenditures. A savings fund is designed
to create a store of wealth for future generations by converting a depletable revenue
stream into a perpetual income flow. 27 There is one other type of NRF – a financing
fund. In the financing fund the operational rules are designed so that it effectively
finances the overall budget balance.28 Appendix I summarizes the main features of the
three types of NRFs.
Rules for accumulation of fiscal resources in NRFs in different countries tend to
be price-contingent (accumulation of revenues greater than at a target price), as in the
case of the Chile Copper Stabilization Funds (CSF); or revenue-contingent (fifty percent
25

Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund, Oman Oil Fund, Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources Stabilization
Fund, Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste
26
Oman's State General Reserve Fund, Kuwait's Reserve Fund for Future Generations, Alaska Permanent
Fund and others.
27
The nomenclature may be misleading. Strictly speaking, it is not possible to “stabilize” flows to the fund
as long as oil prices are unstable. The stabilization fund therefore attempts to stabilize the flows to the
budget by saving during booms and spending during busts.
28
The Norwegian State Petroleum Fund operates on this basis. Recently, The Norwegian State Petroleum
Fund was transferred to the State Pension Fund. Since January 2006, the management of the Petroleum
Fund has been part of the State Pension Fund.

- 20 of the resource revenue), as in the case of the Alaska Permanent Fund; or both (fifty
percent of all oil revenue above a reference price), as in the case of the Venezuela
Stabilization Fund Rule (see table 2).
Table 2. Rules for Accumulation Fiscal Resources in Different NRFs
NRFs with a PriceThe Rule of
Revenue-contingent The Rule of
contingent Rule
Accumulation
NRFs
Accumulation
Oman Oil Fund

Venezuela
Macroeconomic
Stabilization Fund
Rule*
Chile’s Copper
Stabilization Fund

Accumulation of
revenues greater than at
a target price
($15/barrel)
Accumulation of
revenues greater than a
cut-off price (flexible,
can be easily changed)

Kuwait's Reserve Fund
for Future Generations

10% of all budget
revenues

Alaska Permanent Fund,
USA

Accumulation of
revenues greater than a
annually projected price

The Norwegian State
Petroleum Fund/ State
Pension Fund

25 percent of all mineral
lease rentals, royalties,
royalty sales proceeds,
federal mineral revenuesharing payments
All petroleum revenue
after the coverage of
non-oil budget deficit

* Actually, Venezuela’s Fund represents both methods; 50 percent of all oil
revenue above a reference price.
Source: The NRFs’ Legislations.

Withdrawal provisions have tended to be more discretionary than rules-based, in
terms of transfers to the budgets as needed (Alberta, Kuwait, and others), with some
control and oversight in most cases by the ministry of finance, the central bank, or other
government officials (Davis and others 2001; Fasano 2000) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Withdrawal Provisions for Some NRFs
NRFs
Provisions
Kuwait's Reserve Fund for Future
Generations
Alaska Permanent Fund, USA

Oman Oil Fund
The Norwegian State Petroleum Fund
Venezuela Macroeconomic
Stabilization Fund Rule

Financing of the state budget deficit
Approximately 50% of the fund earnings are paid to the
Alaska’s people; other are reinvested. It is determined by the
State Constitution.
Financing of the budget deficit; investments to the oil
industry.
Transfers to the state budget based on a parliamentary
resolution
Since 1999 the president is eligible to make a decision about
the fund’s spending policy

Source: The NRFs’ Legislations.

- 21 Empirically, the effectiveness of funds in mitigating volatility is somewhat
ambiguous. An IMF study estimates the impact of commodity revenues on government
spending to determine whether the establishment of a fund has a significant impact on
government spending (Davis and other 2003:301-302). Based on time-series data for
countries with funds, expenditure appears to be less correlated with changes in revenues
than in countries without funds, as would be expected if the funds work as they are
supposed to; however, this experience is not uniform. In addition, in countries with funds,
the establishment of a fund did not have an identifiable impact on government spending.
This suggests that countries with a stricter budget discipline tended to establish a fund
rather that the fund itself leading to increased expenditure restraint (Davis and other
2003:303).
In the case of specific countries—Chile, Norway, and Oman—funds appear to
deliver a number of favorable outcomes: lower levels of volatility in government
expenditure, reduced government expenditure, and a higher share of gross fixed capital
investment (299).
A number of practical conclusions are drawn from this research:
o A NFR cannot substitute for effective fiscal management in the short run;
o A NRF should be designed properly because there are serious risks of
mismanagement of the natural resource wealth.
o
o
o

A fund can complicate fiscal policy if not well integrated with the budget.
A fund may spend oil revenues inappropriately.
A fund can contribute to lack of transparency and corruption.

o A NRF can serve as a political institution, “a compact between governments and
citizens” (Tsalik 2003:19) if it is designed as a transparent public entity.
o Country-specific circumstances matter a great deal when establishing a NRF.

- 22 A Natural Resource Fund does not guarantee wise management of natural resource
wealth, but it can be a useful tool–provided it goes hand in hand with a fiscal policy
framework that strikes the right balance between current consumption and investment in
development and savings for future generations. The proper design of a NRF is
important. By introducing a high degree of transparency and contributing to informed
public debate, the fund can bolster broad support for the strategy of managing the natural
resource wealth for the benefit of all people, and create trust between government and its
citizens.

- 23 3. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC OVERSIGHT:

MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD WISE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE
WEALTH
This chapter looks specifically at levels of transparency, accountability and public
participation among different NRFs around the world. Related case studies are from
North and South America, Europe, and the Central Asia. Best-practice examples, such as
Norway and Alaska, both democratic states, provide important guidelines for building
transparency, accountability, and public participation into a NRF to make it successful.
By contrast, Alberta (Canada) demonstrates that even if democracy is strong, a lack of
transparency, institutional rigidity, and lack of public involvement decrease effectiveness
of a NRF as a policy institution. Examples such as Venezuela and Kazakhstan
demonstrate how vulnerable a NRF is when power is concentrated in the hands of
bureaucratic elites, manifesting an absence of democracy and ineffective oversight. The
example of Azerbaijan demonstrates that even if corruption is pervasive steady efforts to
disclose the fund’s operations can improve the situation for resource wealth management,
however, not much if the lines of accountability are weak, and the level of public
participation is too low.
The first section of this chapter provides methodological guidelines to evaluate
access to information, accountability and oversight mechanisms of NRFs. The second
section evaluates the levels of transparency of selected NRFs according to the guidelines
provided in the first section. The third section compares lines of accountability in
oversight of Norway’s and Azerbaijan’s funds.

- 24 3.1 Guidelines to Evaluate Access to Information, Accountability and Oversight
Mechanisms of NRFs

For the purpose of this thesis we will not define precisely the theoretical concepts
of transparency, accountability and public participation. Rather, we accept they have
been sufficiently developed by political science and organization theory scholars; and we
will use the broadly acknowledged meanings of these concepts applicable to policy
institutions.
Transparency of any policy institution basically means “access to its information
for everyone.” In a broader and related sense, the concept also applies to the
comprehensiveness and traceability of presented information. Access to information by
itself does not guarantee that the presented information is understandable for the broader
population even if it is easily traceable.29
Accountability of the operations of any business or public entity means being
subject to “checks and balances” at any time. Practically, the “checks and balances”
principle actualizes through the obligation to hold periodic, independent, external audits
to control financial operations, and an independent evaluation to monitor performance.
The idea of public participation basically embraces two practical actions: firstpublic oversight through an officially established oversight body, and second, an
opportunity for broad public input into the decision-making process through annual
forums, referenda or public hearings. There is a direct correlation between a civil
society’s opportunity to participate in the development of a NRF and its level of
understanding of the policies, procedures, practices and mechanisms for managing
29

Some authors refer to traceability as a feature of accountability.

- 25 petroleum revenue. A lack of understanding hampers the opportunity for the majority of
civil society to be involved in decision-making, and increases the probability of conflict
surrounding natural resource revenue.
There are very few studies that provide insight into the means by which NRFs can
be designed to limit government’s discretion in misallocating or wasting natural
resources revenues, and that provide general recommendations for good management of
NRFs.30 The Caspian Watch analysts who studied the best design practices among NRFs
found that “checks and balances,” transparency and public involvement are three
particular factors that contribute to the success of NRFs (Tsalik 2003:19).
According to them, several mechanisms exist by which transparency can be
incorporated into a NRF (Tsalik 2003:49). First, all transfers to and from a fund should
be recorded in the budget and treasury accounts. Second, a NRF, as a keeper of a
resource endowment, should have the same commitment to disclosure as a public
company has to its shareholders. Third, a NRF should publish quarterly reports, results of
external audits, and announcements of tenders. Davis and others emphasize that reports
should contain a summary of the asset allocation of the portfolio and summary statistics
on specific activities of the fund during the year (2003:298).
Transparency should apply not only to the NFR’s activities, but to the entire chain
along which natural resource revenues are earned and spent, according to the principles
of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).31 Many authors argue that most
misappropriation happens long before oil revenues reach a NRF (Karl 1997, Tsalik 2003,
30

Most studies analyze the specific case for a particular country and do not provide general
recommendations for establishing NRFs.
31
The EITI seeks to ensure that the revenues from extractive industries contribute to sustainable
development and poverty reduction.

- 26 and others). Transparency can begin with a requirement for oil (or other resource
extraction) companies to disclose all payments made to host governments.
This, and all other relevant information, should be presented in clear
comprehensible form and language suitable for the broader population’s comprehension,
and translated into all official languages in any particular country. Government should
inform the civil society about its plans for resource revenue management through a
variety of media. All information should be accessible on the Internet, presented on radio
and television and be available in prescribed libraries.
Multiple lines of accountability should be created within a NRF, between the
NRF and the government and between the NRF and the legislature to guarantee
separation of oversight (Tsalik 2003:51). The legislative body, the president, the treasury
department, the central bank and the economic development department should have
some role in overseeing NRF operations, and performance evaluation. These layers of
accountability only work, however, if the separation of powers is real. There must be
some contestation and independence among the various organizations that oversee the
NRF for there to be effective oversight. When legislatures are dominated by the party in
power and opposition forces are marginal, then they are unlikely to provide effective
oversight, even if they have the formal authority to do so.
A NRF must be audited internally and externally according to the best
international business ethics. External audits should include both financial and
performance audits and, if relevant, the procedures for the choice of external managers
for the fund. The financial audit aims to ensure financial compliance, while the
performance evaluation aims to assess whether resources were used in the best possible

- 27 way, and adhered to investment guidelines (Davis and others 2003:298). Such audit and
evaluation should be done by an independent professional company with no financial
interest in the outcome.
Transparency and accountability are necessary but not sufficient components of
informed public participation in democracy. To have an active voice, the public, or at
least a representative body of the public, needs to have a legitimate and formalized role in
overseeing and interacting with industry and government. To create a truly participatory
process in managing natural resource wealth, it is necessary to establish “a fully funded,
empowered, independent, and aggressive citizens’ institution to provide oversight.”
(Steiner 2003:72). This institution functions as a “watchdog” to contribute to an
informed public debate and sound management of the petroleum wealth. Such public
oversight bodies have been created in some oil-producing countries.32
Jennifer Drysdale (2005) provides some practical recommendations to design
such oversight bodies in order to make them effective. She calls them “Consultative
Councils, (3)” and posits, first of all, that a Consultative Council (CC) should be
proposed in the Law, and ideally should have power of veto over government in the
limited NRF area. She goes on to state that a CC should be widely representative, and
have appointees from non-government institutions; that a total number of members
should be defined, with relevant involvement and participation by women; that it is
important that the government provide a CC with sufficient resources; and that the
function, role and purpose of the CC be clear. 33 Drysdale argues it is better not to limit a
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For example, “The Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council in Alaska”, “The Council of Eminent Persons of
Timor-Leste,” and others.
33
For example, a CC could be required to prepare a statement of their purpose and mission in Annual
Reports.

- 28 CC to advising parliament only on appropriations of amounts greater than “estimated
sustainable income” or in a particular period of time. She further recommends that the
members of the oversight body be remunerated.
Public hearings and public forums are the most direct forms of involving citizens
in the process of bringing transparency to deals between governments and the private
sector. Hearings and forums provide the opportunity for many citizens to play a role in
the government decision-making process. It is vital that the law allow for an annual
forum and/or hearings on issues relating to the NRF.
A combination of the transparency, accountability and public participation
features described above is included in the Guidelines for Natural Resource Funds
(Appendix 2). The guidelines represent a list of generic features deemed applicable for
the creation or evaluation of a Natural Resource Fund. The features are generated from
the review of literature on natural resources funds and from various petroleum fund
models from other countries.34 The guidelines have four parts: Part I: Access to
Information (Transparency), Part II: Accountability (Audit Reports), Part III: Public
Participation (Oversight Mechanisms and Public Input), and Part IV: Crucial Elements of
a Good Design Related to Transparency and Public Participation.
We included in the guidelines some additional governance features to be
considered which related to transparency, accountability and public participation issues.
First, a NRF should be established as an amendment to a constitution, and all of the
features of a NRF should be defined by law. The life-span for a fund should be described.
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An initial idea to create this guide came from Drysdale, Jennifer (2005), Comments on the Timor-Leste
Petroleum Fund Draft Act. The Petroleum Fund Steering Group, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/Act/05FundActConsult.htm.

- 29 There can be no misunderstanding should the fund’s existence come into question by
future governments. There must be a separation of governance between the relevant
institutions for effective management of the natural resource revenue: legislative bodies,
treasury departments, central banks and economic development departments. These
institutions should have some overlapping roles in overseeing the NRF’s operations as a
part of the “checks and balances” concept. All transfers to and from a fund should be
recorded in the budget and treasury accounts. Rule changes should be extremely
cumbersome (a constitutional amendment or a legislative super-majority) to guarantee
compliance with the initial goal, objectives and design. These features, in fact, serve as
mechanisms by which transparency and accountability can be incorporated into a NRF.
These guidelines do not pretend to be exhaustive. Validity and reliability were not
checked. Nor are the guidelines likes intended to be a universal evaluation tool to
estimate levels of transparency, accountability and public participation of any NRF. They
represent an example of a general policy tool based on the knowledge and analysis of
literature for the purpose of this policy evaluation. Any feature of these guidelines could
be detailed for a particular research purpose, and additional features could be added.35
We use these guidelines to estimate the level of access to information for selected NRFs
around the world in the next section of this chapter.
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For the purpose of this thesis, we decided to avoid a very detailed breakdown of general features because
the narrow scope of this paper is the Russian Stabilization Fund which is relatively new and in fact has not
started to operate with all its functions yet. Thus, we are not able to use this guide to evaluate the Russia
Fund.

- 30 3.2 Evaluation of Transparency Levels among Six Natural Resource Funds through the
Comparison of Their Websites
In general, a NRF’s transparency can be measured by the scope of information
about the fund’s operations available for the broad population. This information should
be generally available on a fund’s website, upon a request, through radio and TV, via
prescribed libraries, and so forth. A fund as a public policy institution should conduct
periodic outreach activities such as public presentations and press-conferences, and
should provide public services such as tours and internships. Some of these outreach
activities should be offered through their websites. For example, with the Alaska
Permanent Fund’s website everyone can ask questions, share their comments about the
fund’s operations, apply for internships, and request publications. Another important
component of transparency is the comprehensiveness of presented information, which
can be estimated with qualitative and quantitative methods.
Some natural resource funds operate in near total secrecy, and are especially wary
of international observance (Tsalik 2003:44). Good examples are the Persian Gulf
funds.36 Some simply do not maintain websites, as, for example, the Chile Copper Fund,
the Russian Stabilization Fund, and the Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources
Stabilization Fund. This lack of transparency creates difficulties for researchers
evaluating funds’ levels of accountability with full objectivity.37 To be objective, we
decided to narrow the research goal and evaluate the scope of information available on
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The Oman General Reserve Fund publishes no annual report, maintains no website, and shares no
information with the public.
37
There is a temptation to say that if they operate in near total secrecy, that they are not transparent and
accountable at all. The truth is close to this, but should be proven.

- 31 NRFs’ websites.38 Six funds were selected for evaluation of transparency because they
maintain their websites in English and, thus, are available for observation by the broad
worldwide community. They are the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF); the Norwegian State
Petroleum Fund (SPF)/State Pension Fund since January 2006; the Alberta Heritage
Savings Fund (AHSF); the Venezuela Investment Fund of Economic Stabilization
(FIEC); the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAR); the National Fund of
Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK).
The guidelines, presented in section 2.1, are used as an evaluation tool. We first
apply Part I: Access to Information/ Transparency. For the purpose of applying this first
part several general features were developed. The second of these features, “the details of
revenue in a fund,” was divided into four categories: inflows by themselves, breakdown
by source, earnings benchmarks, and return on portfolio.39 The third feature, “the details
of where and how a fund is invested,” were concretized with such “sub-features” as
companies/indexes in which the fund holds assets, market value of holdings in each
company, methodology of investment and risk management, and chosen external asset
managers. The expenditure feature was broken down by the type of expenditures. Other
features were kept as presented in the initial guidelines.
An evaluation scoring system was developed for assessing the transparency of
NRFs. The scoring system is as follow. If generic transparency information is presented
on a website, this fund would have “YES” indicated. If there was no such type of
information at all, the fund would get “NO”. And, if presented information is not
38

The idea came from Tsalik (2003:189). She compared four oil funds’ websites. We added two more
funds. The scope of evaluation and the scoring system was systemized and developed.
39
The categorization could be more detailed. For example, “return on portfolio” could be divided by type
of stocks, bonds, markets, and so on for the purpose of financial analysis. We do not have the purpose of
analyzing the financial performance of NRFs.

- 32 complete, the fund would get “PARTLY” indicated. “YES” has a value of 1 point, “NO”
has 0 point value, and “partly” has 0.5 point value. The higher the score a particular NRF
receives, the higher the level of democratic governance this fund has. Thereafter, we will
compare the democratic governance score received through the evaluation process with
performance results of selected funds, as estimated by other scholars.
The maximum website transparency score theoretically achievable is 22 points.
However, no fund can achieve the maximum because no fund entirely commits to the
principles of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and provides details
of any payments transferred from oil companies to government or individuals
voluntarily.40 Alaska Permanent Fund, with 19 points, and the Norwegian State Pension
Fund, with 16.5 points, are among the leaders (Appendix 3). The Alberta Heritage
Savings Fund and the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan are in the middle,
with 11.5 and 13.5 points, respectively. The Venezuela Investment Fund of Economic
Stabilization and the National Fund of Republic of Kazakhstan have 4.0 and 6.5,
respectively.
This is no surprise for the Alaska and the Norwegian Funds. Both funds were
created in developed democracies with great traditions of budget transparency, a strict
fiscal policy, checks and balances, and public involvement. The combination of
democratic governance in these countries by itself, and the high level of transparency of
their NRFs contribute to the success of both institutions.
The success of both funds was studied, and empirically proved by many scholars
(Fasano 2000, Davis 2003, Tsalik 2003, Scancke 2003), and the effective functioning of
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See EITI’s website for additional information: http://www.eitransparency.org/.

- 33 both these funds can be easily traced by any independent researcher through their
websites.
The success of any NRF can be seen in terms of benefits received by its citizens.
The stabilization function is also very important.41 However, it is a macroeconomic effect
of the fund that is not directly appreciated by citizens, but that contributes to the public
good in the end. For example, Davis and others empirically proved that in Norway
“nonrenewable resource export earnings do not bear a statistically significant positive
relationship to expenditure (2003:299).”42 This means that the Norwegian fund has been
successful as a stabilization fiscal institution. Sterilized oil money becomes savings, and
then benefits the people of Norway through covering a non-oil budget deficit, and paying
pensions from the Fund.
The Alaska Fund, through income-producing investments and inflation proofing,
grew from an initial $10 billion in 1977 to over $30 billion by the end of 2005. Thus, the
principal of the APF has grown three-fold since the Fund’s commencement.43 The fund
also paid out $13.1 billion in dividends to Alaskan citizens since 1982 (APF Annual
Report 2005:2).
The Norwegian Fund was established in 1990; however, the first deposit to the
fund was made in 1995 because of the severe budget deficit in the beginning of 1990 in
41

This effect can be measured as a differential between natural resource export earnings and government
expenditure. The stabilization function works if government expenditures grow much slower than earnings
from resource exports.
42
Davis and others did not study statistically the Alaska Fund.
43
Alaska's constitution divides the Fund into two parts: reserved assets (principal) and unreserved assets
(earnings). Principal comes from: mineral revenue ($8.1 billion into reserved assets to date); special
legislative appropriations from the Fund's earnings ($7 billion total into reserved assets over time); inflation
proofing--the annual legislative transfer from earnings to principal ($8.4 billion into principal over time).
Earnings come from stock dividends/bond interest/real estate rents, and gains or losses from the sale of any
of these investments. The Legislature has used the earnings for several purposes: dividends, inflation-proofing principal, special appropriation to principal and fund-related expenses.

.

http://www.apfc.org/theapfc/tophow.cfm

- 34 Norway. After ten years, the market value of the Petroleum Fund’s combined securities
portfolio was 1183.9 billion krone,44 or approximately $176 billion. Annually, a part of
earnings is deposited after covering the non-oil budget deficit. The amount of deposit is
determined by the Norwegian legislature, unlike in Alaska. Since 2006, a significant
amount of earnings will go to seniors as pensions.
Transparency is an inherent feature of the Alaska Fund’s operations because the
APF is rooted in the belief that Alaskans are the primary stakeholders of their oil
wealth.45 The law on the Fund states that “all information in the possession of the
corporation is a public record” (except for confidential commercial information).46 The
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC)47 Board produces an annual report, which
must be written in “easily understandable language” and be widely available to the
public.48 The law states exactly what the contents of the annual report must include:
audited financial statements, a breakdown of earnings from each investment, and an
appraisal of the value of each investment, and other details. All this information is
available though the Internet and upon request. Additionally, the APF’s website embraces
all legislation and resolutions that apply to the Fund, including papers commissioned for
the trustees and archival reports (Appendix 3).
A key reason for establishing the Norwegian Fund was the desire to make more
transparent the policy choices available to the country, in the face of a decline in oil
revenues and an increase in pension expenses (Davis 2003, 304). The SPF has helped to
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Norway’s State Petroleum Fund’s website:
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- 35 provide a long-term framework for the annual process of setting the non-oil budget
deficit, and finally, since 2006, has become a part of the State Pension Fund. The Norges
Bank, as the manager of the SPF, is required to submit reports to the Finance Ministry
four times a year. These reports, as well as the annual reports and external audit reports,
are available to the public over the Internet (Appendix 3). The reports provide
information on transfers to and from the budget, all of the Fund’s holdings, their value,
their returns, risk management methodology, and administrative costs.
The Alberta Fund in Canada was created at the same time as the Alaska Fund,
with similar royalty payments and objectives49; however, the AHSF has much less
savings compared with the APF. The Heritage Fund’s fair value stands at $13.6 billion as
of December 31, 2005, as reported in the Heritage Fund 2005-06 Third Quarter Report,
released on February 27, 2006.50 However, throughout its 30-year history, the Fund has
generated over $28 billion in investment income that has improved the quality of life in
the province. Unlike the APR, the AHSF was created through the legislative process, and
as a result changes could be made with a simple majority vote in the legislature. Thus, the
APF has experienced no change in is objectives and structure, while the AHSF has
altered many of them in response to shifts in oil revenues and bureaucratic priorities
(Tsalik 2003:26). Since the legislature does not need direct public approval, Alberta’s
attempts to engage the public in the debate about the Fund have not been as extensive as
those in Alaska. The AHSF was managed by the provincial treasury51 and subordinated to
the governor’s cabinet, while the APF was created as a public corporation. As a public
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They could be compared methodologically because both funds were created by independent territorial
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The Alberta Heritage Saving Fund’ website: http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/history.html.
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- 36 corporation, APF allows access to its information to everyone. Because in Alberta the
AHSF is a part of the political process, the information it discloses is comparatively more
limited (Appendix 3). The Alberta Fund does not have an external audit policy at all.
Audits are conducted by a local auditor, and do not include a market value appraisal of
the Fund’s position. As the Caspian Watch analysts conclude, “both the APF and the
AHSF deserve praise—the former for its endurance and investment success, the latter for
its spending on public goods—as well criticism—the APF for its institutional rigidity and
the latter for its lack of it.”(Tsalik 2003:29)
In 1999, Azerbaijan created the SOFAZ to collect and manage all oil revenues
due to government from production sharing agreements.52 The assets of SOFAZ as of
January 1, 2006, stood at 1.3 billion Azeri manat (approximately $1.4 billion).53 The level
of transparency of the SOFAZ in heavily corrupt Azerbaijan appears to be high, even
higher that for the AHSF in democratic Canada (Appendix 3). The SOFAZ maintains its
own well-designed website. Information is presented in comprehensible English and
Azeri. All main reports are available in their entirety: annual reports, external audit
reports, decrees and SOFAZ-related budget issues.54 Some scholars support our finding
that the SOFAZ meet the transparency design criterion (Wakerman-Linn, Mathieu and
Selm 2003: 353). The SOFAZ has already had positive effects. Not only has it helped
mitigate real exchange-rate appreciation, but it has also improved Azerbaijan’s image
among foreign investors. In November 2004, Fitch Ratings upgraded Azerbaijan’s longterm foreign currency rating from a BB-(2002) to BB with “a stable outlook, reflecting
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Azerbaijan has also signed over 20 other production sharing agreements with approximately 30
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- 37 macroeconomic stability, low government debt, and development in the oil and gas
sector.”55 Azerbaijan has also taken significant steps to implement the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which will promote oil revenue transparency.
The Committee on EITI established by the Government of Azerbaijan, on January 27,
2006, announced the release of the Government’s third EITI report, audited by AGN
MAK,56 an independent auditor.57 Despite all these positive effects, a number of
ambiguities in the revenue rules were found by another independent audit company, Ernst
and Young (Tsalik 2003:109). Criteria of expenditures as diverse as assistance to
refugees and funding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline are also still not clear. The
accountability lines just do not exist. Unfortunately, the President of Azerbaijan has total
control of the SOFAZ, and there is a lack of mechanisms for true public oversight.58
Venezuela has repeatedly established special funds to manage its petroleum
wealth. The most recent fund is FIEM, established in 1998. The experience with this fund
was also disappointing, as it has not resulted in an improved fiscal performance (Davis
2003: 309). The transparency level of the FIEM is close to “zero” (Appendix 3). Very
limited information could be found on its website; however, even this information was
not complete and there was even no more recent year than 2002. This is an indication that
the situation with transparency and accountability is deteriorating. Taking into
consideration the low level of democracy in this country, and the concentration of
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- 38 political power in the president’s hands, we can conclude that the FIEM is hardly able to
contribute to fair and wise management of Venezuela’s natural resource wealth.
In August of 2000, the Kazakh Oil Fund was created. The fund received its first
deposit of $660 million from the sale of a five-percent share in the TengizChevron
consortium.59 According to the International Monetary Fund, by September 2004 the
NFRK balance reached $3.7 billion.60
The NFRK operates with some transparency, but with great opportunities for
improvement. The National Bank of Kazakhstan produces periodic reports for the finance
ministry on the Fund’s investments, but they are not available for public scrutiny. Instead,
quarterly and annual aggregated statements in a table format are placed on its website.61
There is no information about the fund’s investment strategy at all. Audit reports, as
internal as well as external, are not open for public view. There is a very high probability
that oil revenues could be diverted before reaching the Fund. Oil swaps, the export of
crude to Russia below market prices, and other similar activities generate net revenues
that never make it into the NFRK (Tsalik 2003: 152). Kazakhstan’s national oil and gas
company operates in total secrecy and contributes to the lack of transparency in the
management of the Kazakh people’s natural endowment.
According to the Caspian Watch analysts, the creation of multiple lines of
accountability is a useful mechanism by which transparency can be incorporated into a
NRF (Tsalik 2003:49-51). A comparative analysis of accountability lines between the
Norwegian and Azerbaijan Funds in section 2.3 provides additional ideas as to why the
Azeri Fund has not been successful despite a relatively high level of transparency.
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- 39 3.3 Comparative Analysis of Accountability Lines in Oversight of Norwegian
and Azerbaijan Oil Funds
The results of the evaluation in the previous section make clear that it is not
enough simply to disclose information about a NRF’s operations. Rather, transparency
should be an inherent feature of a resource fund if it is to work. Many scholars agree that
there are several crucial mechanisms for incorporating transparency into a fund’s everyday operations (Davis 2003, Tsalik 2003, Drysdale 2005, Delvin and Lewin, 2005,
Fasano 2000). Actually, we already mentioned these mechanisms in Section 2.1, and
placed them into Part VI of the Guidelines. We called them “Generic Good Design
Features.”
In this section of the thesis we will emphasize the importance of the proper
institutional design of a NRF, which can make earnings and spending more transparent.
More precisely, we will look at the ideal organizational structure of a fund, which
guarantees separation of power, checks and balances, and public participation in
managing and overseeing a fund’s operations. Svetlana Tsalik calls the organizational
structure of a generic NRF “multiple lines of accountability,” meaning that the proper
institutional structure and design encourages fiscal responsibility and prevents possible
abuses of fund revenues from despotic political leaders and lobbies (Tsalik 2003:50). As
we already mentioned above in Section 2.1, accountability lines should guarantee a share
in management and overseeing NRF operations for a legislative body, a president, a
treasury department, a central bank, an economic development department, and other
institutions involved in management of natural resources. In this regard, several
independent oversight and consulting entities must be established.

- 40 Two NRFs were selected for comparative analysis of their multiple lines of
accountability: the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund/ State Pension Fund62 and the State
Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The reason for this comparative selection is that
the Norwegian Fund is usually referred to as a model of accountability, with a great
separation of powers, while the Azerbaijan Fund represents an example of superpresidential authority in managing a national petroleum fund.
The Norwegian Fund is one of the world’s largest natural resource funds in terms
of the volume of principal (savings function). Its stabilization function is also widely
appreciated by scholars and by its citizens. The broad population of Norway enjoys a
high level of transparency, accountability and public involvement, and the citizens
directly benefit from the SPF pension program. The success of the Norwegian Fund has
many observers asking two main questions: How did they achieve these results? Is the
Norwegian Fund’s design suitable for any country with abundant natural resources as a
generic model for their NRF?
The Norwegian Fund can be viewed as a successful institutional arrangement
(Fasano 2000:4). Formally, the SPF is a krone account with Norges Bank (the Norwegian
central bank). The Ministry of Finance is a general manager or “an owner” of the Fund,
which has delegated operational management of the Fund to Norges Bank. The bank
manages the Fund’s capital in accordance with provisions laid down by the Ministry of
Finance. These provisions are set out in a management agreement between the Ministry

62

The Government Pension Fund was established on January, 1, 2006. The Fund is comprised of the
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- 41 of Finance and the bank.63 Under the agreement, the Ministry of Finance utilizes advice
from the bank in its work with the Fund’s investment strategy, and the bank advises the
ministry on strategic choices for the Petroleum Fund.
The Ministry of Finance’s choice of investment strategy is the key driver of the
Fund’s risk/return strategy. 64 There is a public consensus in Norway that the Fund must
act as a professional financial investor.
The Ministry of Finance and the Norges Bank have a right to incorporate changes
into the Government Petroleum Fund’s framework based on the consensus between
them.65 Although such changes do not require legislative approval, in practice the
Norwegian government has always consulted with parliament and has kept it well
informed of any developments concerning the Fund (Tsalik 2003: 38). The Office of
Auditor General, which is appointed by and reports directly to Parliament, ensures
parliamentary control on Fund operations. In addition, a supervisory council (Norges
Bank Supervisory Council) examines the executive board’s annual reports, the bank
financial statements, and the auditor’s reports.66 The Ministry also hires an independent
auditor to evaluate all financial results on an annual basis (Appendix 4).
The organizational structure of the Fund has been constantly developed to make
the fund more financially effective and accountable to the people. Recently, two new
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- 42 consulting entities were created to assist the Ministry of Finance in management of the
Fund. In 2004 the Ministry established an ethics council to advise itself on any exclusion
of companies called for under the Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines. The Ministry is
responsible for deciding exclusions, based on recommendations from the Petroleum
Fund’s Advisory Council on Ethics.67 In September 2005, the Ministry of Finance
appointed a professional advisory council (Investment Strategy Council) to assist the
Ministry with investment strategy (Appendix 4).68
Despite the obvious success of the Norwegian Fund in the separation of powers,
transparency and accountability, there are some features of the Fund’s design that limit its
applicability as a model for other countries, especially for developing ones with a lack of
democracy.
As previously mentioned, a NRF should be established as an amendment to a
constitution. The SPF was created through the legislative process, and as a result any
changes can be made with a simple majority vote in the legislature. To date, Norway has
not experienced a sharp decrease in oil prices. However, if oil prices fall there are no
impediments to parliament’s authorizing the use of the Fund’s principal, as occurred in
Alberta with its democratic governance (Tsalik 2003:40).
As previously stated, the government of Norway has a right to incorporate
changes into the Petroleum Fund’s framework based on the consensus between the
Ministry and the bank without the legislative body. To ensure accountability, a
sophisticated system of checks and balances, and a clear division of responsibilities, were
set up between the Ministry and the bank (Scancke 2003:327). It appears that in countries
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- 43 with a weak system of checks and balances, rule changes should be extremely
cumbersome, either through a constitutional amendment or a legislative super-majority.
Unlike the resource funds in Alaska, Alberta, and Venezuela, Norway’s SPF does
not specify what share of oil revenues are to be deposited each year as principal. Rather,
deposits are determined annually by the legislature. Thus, it is entirely up to the
legislature to determine how much to deposit to or withdraw from the SPF. Norway has a
long tradition of budget transparency and a strict fiscal policy. In countries like
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, where budget transparency and controls are still in
formation, tighter rules on NRF revenues and expenditures are needed. Ideally, these
rules should be defined by law.
The Azeri Fund is an independent off-budget legal entity with its own
administrative structure. Foreign oil companies deposit payments to SOFAZ into a
special account at the National Bank.69 These deposits do not depend on oil price, but
represent a fixed percentage of oil proceeds. In this regard, SOFAZ most resembles the
Alaska Fund. However, the Alaska Fund was established as a public company with a
great commitment of disclosure and public involvement. In contrast, the Azeri Fund is
accountable and responsible to only one person in the country--the President of the
Republic of Azerbaijan.70 There are no limitations to the president’s discretion. There are
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Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on establishment of the State Oil Fund of the
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- 44 no checks and balances to provide oversight. The parliament has no role whatsoever in
Azerbaijan. Officially, the executive director operates the Fund. However, he is
appointed by, and can be dismissed only by, the president. An investment board reviews
the investment strategy of the fund. However, the board consists of the executive director
and senior officials of relevant SOFAZ departments. The supervisory council is
appointed by, and subordinated to, the president. The only members of the council not
directly subordinate to the president are two parliamentary representatives and the
president of the Academy of Science. The council is currently comprised of eight
members; and no representatives of any public organization sits on the council. 71 Thus,
in contrast with Norway, lines of accountability in management of the Azeri Fund are
extremely simple (Appendix 5).
Taking into consideration the fact that the fund’s revenues are not incorporated
into a state budget, this, in tandem with the absolute power of the president over the
fund’s operations, greatly risks that SOFAZ cannot transfer revenues back to the budget
in times when the people of Azerbaijan need them.
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- 45 4. POLICY CHALLENGES FOR MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIA’s PETROLEUM
WEALTH

There is no question but that Russia has tremendous natural resources. Indeed,
Russia holds the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and has significant proven
and unproven reserves of oil. Nowadays, Russia is the world’s second largest producer
and exporter of oil and the first producer and exporter of natural gas.72 Russia is also rich
in other natural resources, including coal, metals and diamonds. The question is to what
extent Russia, as a country with abundant resources, is able to provide decent living
standards to the majority of its population through distribution of revenues generated by
exporting oil and gas. Another key strategic question is what national interest Russia will
pursue in the face of high prices on the world oil market. Strategic dilemmas for the
Russian energy sector are discussed in Section 4.1, below.
It appears that the latest trend in Russian politics is associated with seeking
restoration of a centralized political and economic environment, and utilizing its energy
influence on neighboring countries, former republics of the Soviet Union, as a tool for
restoring political control on these countries.73 The question is to what extent the oil
boom of early 2000 contributed to these backward tendencies in accordance with the
theoretical framework provided in Chapter 1. An adverse development of the Russian oil
sector as a response to high oil prices is the topic of Section 4.2.
The Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF) was launched on
January 1, 2004, as a fiscal policy institution to mitigate volatility of hydrocarbon prices.
The principal of the RSF is growing very fast, far beyond the initial growth prognosis
72
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- 46 because of the fast raising of oil prices. It appears that the Russian Fund operates in
nearly total secrecy. It publishes no annual report, maintains no website, and shares no
significant financial information with the public. Because of a lack of strict budget
discipline, a weak civil society, and a high level of corruption, there is the risk that large
numbers of petrodollars will be spent on interests of the Russian bureaucratic elite. This
is the point of Section 4.3 of this chapter.
The final section of this chapter provides recommendations to promote
accountability and public oversight in the management of Russian’s natural endowment.
4.1 Strategic Dilemmas for Russia as a Resource-abundant Country
A country is referred to as being resource-abundant if its budget is largely
dependent on revenues from the export of natural resources. It is not enough for the
country to be rich in natural resources; the main prerequisite for being resource-abundant
is a high budget dependency on income from natural resource trade on the world market.
For example, the United States has a very high level of oil reserves and production,
higher than that of Norway, Qatar, Oman, Kazakhstan, and other resource-abundant
countries. However, the United States is not resource-abundant, by definition, because it
does not export hydrocarbons.74
By definition, Russia is a resource-abundant country. In 2005, extraction,
refining, and transportation of hydrocarbons comprised 26 percent of Russia’s GDP and
59 percent of its export revenues (Kudrin 2006:30). A Russian state budget experiences
high dependence on “crude” income, and this was especially true during the period of
soaring oil prices in the middle of 2000. In 2004, when prices were lower than now, the
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- 47 oil and gas industry provided 23 percent of budget inflows. In 2005 it was 30 percent.
According to Kudrin (2006), a fluctuation of the world oil price in amplitude of 23-50
dollars per barrel creates an alteration of the Russian budget within a range of 16-23
percent of GDP (31).
Russia will never be like Saudi Arabia or Norway. The obvious difference lies in
the fact that despite comparable volumes of oil and gas revenues and production and
export revenues, Russia has a much larger population.75 Table 4, below, demonstrates
that the per capita volumes of hydrocarbon production and exports of the same leave
little, if any, prospect for Russia to ensure normal living conditions for the majority of its
citizens, based on hydrocarbon revenues alone. It is worth mentioning that, unlike other
resource-abundant countries, Russia has an extensive domestic consumption of
hydrocarbons. Thus, the ability to sell oil and gas under high international prices is
limited.
Table 4. Per Capita Hydrocarbon Production and Export in Various oil abundant
countries, 2003
Production and
Kuwait
UAE Norway Saudi
Venezuela Russia Nigeria
Export per capita
Arabia
Annual hydrocarbon 55.2
51.9 48.6
25.7
7.1
6.9
1.1
production, ton of
oil equivalent per
capita
Annual hydrocarbon
exports, ton of oil
equivalent per capita

27.5

29.4

42.2

15.4

3.7

2.5

0.9

Source: Counted based on Key World Energy Statistics. IEA. 2005, p. 48-59.
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/key2005.pdf.

From Table 4, above, we can conclude that Russia, in its capacity as a resourceabundant country is more similar to countries like Venezuela and Nigeria, which also
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- 48 have massive populations. The ability of these nations to improve the lives of its citizens
significantly through oil wealth is obviously very low. Therefore, the pretension of
Russian authorities of being able to establish a successful state purely on redistribution of
export oil revenues has no basis in reality and is, in fact, fallacious or at least inaccurate
(Milov 2006:5). Even skyscraping oil and gas prices are not able to cover up the
hardships of the Russian economy, the weaknesses of its policy institutions and its poor
governance. Despite Russia’s resource abundance, Russia cannot become a successful
state without structural reforms, democratization and marketization, relying purely on
income from oil and gas export.
However, it appears that Russia is now moving back (or, at least, is not moving
forward) in terms of democratic and market reforms. A famous emeritus Russian
economist, Evgeny Yasin, pointed out that from the middle of 2003 backward political
changes in Russia have begun following changes in economic life (Yasin 2005:16).
The dilemma of what path the Russian people should follow has been the subject
of popular public discourse in Russia since, probably, Peter the Great. There were always
three main options: to study and learn from the West; to look at, and be influenced by, the
East; or to follow its own unique Russian path. Nowadays, Russia, in a new political and
global framework, is still not quite sure where to go. As Vladimir Milov, president of the
Institute of Energy Policy in Russia, points out, on the one hand, the goal of maintaining
sustainable development in the globalizing world requires that Russia build a competitive
and open economy and a modern democratic state. On the other, Russia is still under the
influence of a totalitarian past and has a temptation to seize global influence by
sacrificing human rights, openness, economic development, and “promoting of neo-

- 49 imperial foreign policy approaches.” (Milov 2006: 1). For example, Russia will hold the
G8 Energy Security Summit later this year (2006) and promises a commitment to
sustainable development and the principles of EITI.76 But, in stark opposition, Russia
engages in “energy imperialism” with neighboring countries. This centralization of
political power is clearly driven by authorities, but it is also largely supported by the
Russian population, according to opinion polls (See Table 5).
Table 5. The Approval Level of Russian President Putin’s Politics
2006 January, 23-27 February, 10-13
March, 10-13
Approve
71
75
72
Do not approve 27
23
26
No answer
2
2
2
Source: 2006 opinion polls by Levada Center. http://www.levada.ru.

In the Russian energy sector, this dilemma has been particularly visible. After
privatization and restructuring of the oil and gas sector in the 1990s, oil and gas became
the most competitive and rapidly developing sector of the Russian economy. However,
since mid-2003 Russian authorities have been targeting the oil and gas sector to regain
control over it, creating a reversal in the economic policy model.

4.2 Adverse Development of the Russian Oil Sector in Response to High Oil
Prices in Mid-2000
The theoretical discussion in chapter two explained that the negative use of
natural resources can undermine democracy through three major “rentier” conditions
produced by windfall gains and usually manifesting themselves as direct effects which
are extremely strong, negative and persuasive. In the first such possible effect, the state
has less need for taxation, and citizens have less incentive to develop and improve upon
76
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- 50 civil society. In the second of these effects, the government, using its exogenous
revenues, purchases media and provides benefits for selected members and groups of the
population. The third effect, the steady natural resource revenues prevent government
from instituting needed institutional reforms. All three effects exacerbate corruption.
Russian authorities have exhibited these behavioral tendencies since the middle of
2003, after oil prices rose sharply from $23 per barrel in May 2003 to $65 in March
2006.77 During this same period, the government closed several offices of international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), accused them of espionage78 and took control
over major media interests.79 Legal, housing, military, and administrative reforms have
been stagnating. President appointed the Institute of Regional Governors, “Putin’s ears
and eyes,” as people call them, three years ago. The TI Corruption Perception Index for
Russia decreased from 2.7 in 2003 to 2.4 in 2005.80 In the energy sector, adverse
development appears in restoring ownership in the largely privatized oil sector, banning
the construction of private oil pipelines, rejecting the idea of market restructuring of gas
giant Gazprom, closing the doors for foreign investors, and using energy as a political
tool (Milov 2006, Yasin, 2005, Belton 2004).
In 2003, less than 15 percent of oil production was attributed to state-dominated
companies, but at the end of 2005 some 35 percent was so attributed, and experts in the
field believe that by the end of 2006 this share may reach 60-70 percent (Milov 2006:1).
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During this period of May 2003 to March 2006, Russian export oil taxes increased significantly. On the
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80
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- 51 The process of oil industry re-nationalization in Russia appears to have started
with “the Yukos case.” By early 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos,
publicly criticized the Russian government for its alleged intention to control all of the oil
pipelines within Russia.81 Thereafter, the government took swift and decisive action.
They arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky and accused him of violating tax laws. The
government demanded that Yukos pay back taxes owed and fines for not having paid
them in the 1990s. It also froze all assets of the company, which prevented Yukos from
being able to use its assets as collateral to borrow money for the purpose of paying the
taxes. Once it became apparent that Yukos would be unable to pay the $28 billion in
delinquent taxes and fines, the government auctioned off Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos’
principal oil-producing unit.82 Rosneft, a state-dominated company, purchased
Yuganskneftegaz. The Rosneft’s takeover meant re-nationalization of 11 percent of
Russia’s oil output (Belton 2004).
Did the increase in oil prices in 2003 or Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s rash behavior
cause the government to renationalize Yukos? At a glance, the action appears to stem
from a conflict of personalities, especially since Mr. Khodorkovsky was financing
opposition parties to government incumbents and was being praised outside of Russia by
major politicians around the world. On the other hand, if oil prices had stayed low, the
government might have wanted a more efficient, independent Yukos to expand
production and help the economy. However, with higher oil prices it is more likely the
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- 52 case that the government saw an easy way to extract higher revenues for itself by simply
re-nationalizing the company.83
Additionally, the re-nationalization of companies may become even easier. In
April 2005 the Russian Federal Tax Service appealed to the Constitutional Court to
remove all remaining protections that tax-evading companies have been, allegedly,
enjoying since the 1990s. While curbing tax evasion is commendable, it could be that
virtually every major company in Russia is subject to prosecution, not necessarily
because of purposeful tax evasion but, as Fak (2005) explains, due to the fact that tax
laws in the 1990s were too complex and often contradictory.
“The era of quick recovery and success of the Russian oil sector, led by private
initiative and introduction of Western-type engineering and management practices, is
over. It is replaced by domination of state companies which experience huge financial
difficulties and upstream production challenges” (Milov 2006:7). The theoretical
explanation for this phenomenon is Reynolds’ (1999) risk aversion model that explains
adverse effects of exploration and development of oil reserves. The main idea of the
model is that small private firms tend to be more risk-seeking than the large state-owned
companies. In this connection, Russian crude oil production growth has been
dramatically slowing recently, which some experts fear may be a plateau of matured oil
fields in Western Siberia. In 2003, the growth rate for crude oil production was 11
percent, in 2004 it was 8.9 percent, and in 2005 it was only 2.4 percent.84
At the same time, the geological conditions for exploration and extraction of oil
and gas in Russia are deteriorating. The majority of production comes from matured oil
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- 53 and gas fields, and further response to growing hydrocarbon demand would require
development of the greenfield area in remote regions (Eastern Siberia, North and Pacific
offshore), but without the existing infrastructure. According to Energy Policy Institute
analysts, Russia’s financial system is unable to provide the financing needed to invest in
such projects, and Russian companies are not equipped with the proper technologies
needed to work in specific exploration areas (Milov 2006:9).
In this environment, an important issue is the access of foreign investors to
Russia’s upstream energy sector and infrastructure. However, it appears that the
government has a plan to restrict foreign equity participation in oil and gas field operators
through a new subsoil law. The last draft of this new subsoil law was submitted to the
Duma by the Russian government on June 17, 2005.85
At first glance, the new law looks to encourage private ownership of oil leases
and free markets because it allows current license holders (controlling 92 percent of
Russian oil and 83 percent of its natural gas) to continue operating under the license
system until their licenses expire. It will also require companies to register those permits
for exploration as “property rights” (the Draft of Subsoil Law 2005). Therefore, a
“parallel universe” of license-based oil and gas development alongside contract-based
development is allowed. While this does create some uncertainty for oil companies, at
least any disputes between the government and the contract holders will have to be settled
in court instead of being adjudicated by government regulators. Since courts are more
independent than the regulatory agencies, this parallel universe may be more favorable
for private ownership than an exclusive license-based system. The only legal problem is

85

It has been under discussion since 2003.

- 54 that the Civil Code “lease” contracts have been replaced by “subsoil” contracts, which are
completely new, and the courts have no experience with such cases.
On the other hand, items in the draft clearly suggest that the government is
reestablishing control of the oil industry and restricting foreign equity participation in the
oil and gas sector. For example:
-

While the draft does not prohibit foreign investment, it substantially discourages it.
The government may simply ban the involvement of foreign companies in future
bidding in an ad hoc or makeshift manner. 86

-

The Russian government may exclude foreign companies from participating in the
development of Russia’s oil and gas reserves even if foreign ownership of a joint
venture company is less than 50 percent. “It means that companies with even one
percent of foreign participation most definitely will not have access to the auction.”
(IEP 2005, p. 6).

-

The “temporary operator” clause allows the government the right to select a company
to operate an oil or gas field for up to one year. This noncompetitive process is a
potential way for the government to transfer control of the oil and gas fields to
“trusted,” i.e., state-owned, companies.87
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- 55 The whole story of restoration of state control in the Russian oil and gas sectors is
similar to the Mexican model with its ineffective Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex). It has big
resources, but troubles with production due to economic inefficiency and entry barriers
for foreign investment, unlike, for example, the Saudi Arabian or Norwegian models.
Another possible direction of the new energy policy agenda of Russian authorities
in the energy area is to use energy as a political tool. Russia’s recent gas conflict with
Ukraine has served as a serious warning to the international community that Russia has
the ability and the will to effectuate a cutoff of gas supplies as it deems politically
necessary. The conflict associated with Russian gas cutoffs to Ukraine occurred in late
2005 - early 2006, at the same time that Russia assumed the G8 presidency. President
Putin, in his welcome speech, emphasized the importance of establishing a reliable
system of energy security as a strategic goal for the G8 and the world community as a
whole.88 In this connection, there is still hope that Russia will be able to overcome
imperialistic tendencies and become a reliable energy supplier driven mostly by
economic motivation, which, in turn, will motivate and improve the stability of Russian
energy supplies.

4.3 Poor Design of the Russian Stabilization Fund

The Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF) was created on
December 23, 2003, by the Russian legislature. According to law, SFRF becomes a part
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- 56 of the federal budget when the actual price of oil exceeds the base price of oil.89 The law
set the base price at $20 per barrel of Urals oil, above which revenues start accumulating
in the stabilization fund, while the government has the right to withdraw money from the
Fund if oil prices fall below the base level.90 A base threshold to start withdrawing money
from the fund was determined by the law as 500 billion rubles (approximately $18
billion). However, within just one year, this threshold was surpassed. By March 1, 2006,
the fund had accumulated 1,563 billion rubles (approximately $55.82 billion).91 The
Ministry of Finance calculated that by January 1, 2007, the Fund grows to 2.1 billion
rubles (approximately $75 billion).
There are two main inflow, or income, streams for the SFRF: an oil export tax and
an oil extraction tax. There is a special formula to calculate the amount of inflows that
connects collected taxes to the world oil price. Below, Table 6 illustrates the breakdown
of the Fund’s inflows, accumulated to date.
Table 6. The Russian Stabilization Fund’s Inflows, by Types of Taxes (in billions
of rubles)
2004
2005
Oil extraction tax collected by the State Budget 355.1
761.3
Oil extraction tax transferred to the
193.2
525.0
Stabilization Fund
Oil Export Tax collected by the State Budget
371.3
871.4
Oil Export Tax transferred to the Stabilization
282.4
705.1
Fund
Total inflows transferred to the Fund
475.6
1230.1
Urals oil price
34.4
50.6
Source: Kudrin, Aleksey 2006. Stabilization Fund: Foreign and Russian Experience (In
Russian) Voprosy Economiki. #2, February, p. 40.
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- 57 The ratio between these two types of taxes is approximately 40:60 for the
extraction tax and the export tax respectively. Thus, the export tax is the major revenue
source for the Fund.
According to law, the Fund’s accumulations can be used for financing a budget
deficit when oil prices fall below the base level. The accumulations can be used for other
purposes, as well. The law does not specify what these other purposes may be. The
spending strategy of the Fund is determined by the federal budget law on an annual basis.
Thus, it is up to the legislature solely to determine how much to deposit, or to withdraw
from, the SFRF.
In 2004 the Fund’s money was frozen. In 2005, 46.5 percent of the Fund’s
revenues were spent to repay a portion of the Russian foreign debt ahead of schedule and
two percent was spent to cover State Pension Fund deficits (Table 7).
Table 7. Inflows and Spending Strategy of the Russian Stabilization Fund in 2004
and 2005 (in billions of rubles)
2004
2005
Balance at the beginning of the fiscal year
106.3
522.3
Inflows
415.9
1392.11
Spending:
0
-677.3
• Repayment of Russian foreign debt;
0
-30.0
• Transfers to the Pension Fund
Balance at the end of the fiscal year
522.3
1237.0
Source: Source: Kudrin, Aleksey 2006. Stabilization Fund: Foreign and Russian
Experience (In Russian) Voprosy Economiki. #2, February, p. 40.
The organizational structure of the SFRF is similar to the Norwegian model. The
revenues of the SFRF are accumulated in an isolated account in the Central Bank of
Russia. The Russian Ministry of Finance makes strategic investment decisions and
oversees the Central Bank’s financial operations with the Fund’s money. The Central

- 58 Bank of Russia is the operational manager.92 The Ministry of Finance provides quarterly
and annual investment reports to the government. Upon review and revision, the
government submits these revised reports to the Duma. However, unlike Norway, the law
and decree that created the Fund do not suggest the creation of any other consulting or
overseeing agency to assist the ministry in management of the Fund. Thus, the lines of
accountability appear to be poor (See, Appendix 6).
According to the decree, the Stabilization Fund’s assets can be placed in a form of
securities of the governments of such foreign states as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Great
Britain and the United States. The emitter of securities should have a rating of long-term
credit status not below a level of “AAA”, as classified by such rating agencies as FitchRatings and Standard and Poors; nor below a level “Aaa” for the rating agency Moody’s
Investment Service.93
The financial effectiveness of the SFRF is somewhat questionable. After two
years of operation, Russian senators have begun asking questions about the Fund’s
investment and spending strategies. The discussion became especially hot during the
period of time when the budget draft of 2006 was being considered.
The Committee Council of the Russian Federation considered the problem of the
Fund’s inefficient investment strategies for the 2005 fiscal year.94 The Account Chamber
calculated that because of inflation the Fund lost approximately 23 billion rubles ($820
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- 59 million) (Kipelman 2005:71). According to the Chamber, the investment strategy was
weak.95 The Deputy Minister of Finance tried to justify this weakness by arguing that the
low profitability of bonds in which the Fund invested money, was offset by their high
reliability. He said that this careful investment strategy coincided with the main purpose
of the Fund to keep a part of oil revenues out of the Russian economy.96 The Minister of
Finance tried to defend the poor financial performance of the Fund and then announced
his estimation of a projected savings on percentage of the Russian foreign debt in 2006
because of early repayment of a portion of the Russian foreign debt, amounting to
approximately $1 billion (Kudrin 2006:40).
Thereafter, the Russian senators expressed even more concern with the Fund’s
spending strategy. In fact, the senators also conveyed their readiness to prove the
existence of the Stabilization Fund was illegal.97 On January 18, 2006, the Committee
Council of the Federation discussed the new budget code prepared by the Ministry of
Finance. According to the opinion of many senators, the basic financial law of the
country has so many “blanks” that it could be possible to show and prove that the
government illegally spends about one-half of the Fund’s revenues.98 This writer believes
this assertion to be inaccurate. Rather, the claim appears to arise from citizens’ concerns
about the Fund’s ineffectiveness, ambiguities, its lack of transparency, together with its
lack of accountability.
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- 60 Clearly, the effectiveness of the SFRF as a fiscal policy institution, to date, is
mixed. The Fund has had some positive effects in curbing an over-appreciation of the
ruble, repaying foreign debt and saving money for future generations. However, overall,
the investment strategy cannot be viewed objectively and pronounced a success.
It appears that the Russian Fund as a political institution, that should create trust
between the legislature, other parts of the government and Russian citizens, is not
succeeding well at this task. In the last months of 2005, tensions between the Duma and
the administration regarding spending projections for 2006 and the actual expenditures of
2005 grew to the point of creating near political instability. The broad Russian population
is not satisfied with the low level of transparency currently being exhibited by the Fund.
A lack of transparency creates gossip among the people that oil money is being spent on
personal conveniences by top Russian bureaucrats. According to a recent opinion poll by
the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 88 percent of Russian citizens would
like the government to spend several billions of petrorubles today, thereby avoiding the
risk that oil prices will drop and budgetary problems appear, because the simple truth is
that the people do not believe the government is able to manage the oil money in their
best interests.99
Why did all this happen with the brand new Russian Stabilization Fund?
It is obvious that a variety of mistakes were made in designing the Russian Fund:
major mistakes in predicting oil market dynamics and, consequently, related mistakes in
setting the threshold and base prices of oil. In addition there was a failure to establish
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- 61 limits concerning the size of the Fund, together with a failure to account for weaknesses
in the law or to create automatic correcting mechanisms.
The Account Chamber has concluded that the major mistake when creating the
Fund was the lack of proper legislative input. The law that established the Fund in 2003
was too general and abstract. In fact, the designers of the Fund believed that the threshold
would provide “a breathing space” for at least 3-4 years until Fund money could be used.
Their hope was that within this time needed decrees and regulations would have
sufficiently developed in an addition to the law. Thus, this weakness in the law and the
corresponding inherent legal weakness in the Fund was a failed calculated gamble
responsible for the mistakes in predicting the oil market.
As early as the middle of 2004 it became obvious that the threshold was passed
and that an amendment to the law with a clear investment strategy needed urgent and
immediate development. A later decree, on September 30, 2004 amended the law with
some articles regarding an investment strategy for the Fund. However, the amendments
did not provide sufficient substantive details or other enduring guidance. As of this
writing, an agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank that is
supposed to determine details of an investment strategy (a calculation of the size of the
investment portfolio, its currency structure, risk management parameters, and other
issues) has not yet been created, even though provided for by the State Decree of
September, 30, 2004.100
Just as fundamental, an acceptable level of transparency and accountability, with
an opportunity for public oversight and participation in the decision making of the Fund,
does not exist. Information concerning the Fund’s operations is difficult to secure for
100
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- 62 purposes of analysis. The SFRF does not maintain its own website. It is possible to find
some eclectic information about the Fund on different governmental websites.101
However, the information is not systematized. There are no special sections or archives
collecting legislative actions, press releases or other materials concerning the Fund on
these websites. Russia does not even list the SFRF as being among its state funds. It
would appear that either the government is not sure about the status of the Fund or is not
listing the Fund for the purpose of limiting the Fund’s level of transparency even more.
Some limited information, such as newspaper and several scholarly articles, about the
Fund was published in the media, indicating some minimal level of observational
transparency exists in the Fund’s operations.
Apart from these political deficiencies, there are concerns about the source of
revenues for the Fund. A group of Russian geologists suggest that an oil extraction tax
should not be transferred to the Stabilization Fund because it limits the investment
capacity of oil companies to develop new, often more expensive, oil fields (Kipelman
2005: 81).102 They also criticize an increase in the oil export tax (30 percent corresponds
with an oil price of $20 per barrel and more than 70 percent corresponds with an oil price
of $60 per barrel).
Despite the observed weaknesses of the Fund, it appears the government is not
going to give up on the Fund (as has happened several times in Venezuela). Recently,
some possible changes in the Fund’s structure were discussed in the corridors of power.
The government is considering delegating more authority to the Central Bank for
101
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- 63 management of the Fund’s investment portfolio as a professional financial institution.
Auditing Chamber Chairman Sergey Stepashin is considering auditing the Fund’s
operations as one of the key aspects of the Chamber’s work. In his speech at the six
Conference of the Association of Controlling and Auditing Institutions of Russia, Sergey
Stepashin called cooperation of auditing institutions with law-enforcers “very effective.”
According to Stepashin, in 2003, after examinations conducted by auditing institutions,
law-enforcers started 240 investigations of suspected criminal cases. And this appears to
be just the beginning. “If we want to build an effective democratic state based on the rule
of law and want to eradicate corruption in Russia, we need thoroughly elaborated laws
and strict observance of them,” said Stepashin.103 In addition, the government is
considering the establishment of an institute of external auditor to evaluate the Fund
based upon world-wide practice.

4.4. Recommendations for Promoting Transparency, Accountability and Public Oversight
in Management of the Russian Stabilization Fund
Theoretical framework and factual analysis provided in the first two chapters,
addressed and proved the hypothesis: that the more transparent, accountable and open for
public scrutiny any NRF is, the more likely the fund will perform effectively in terms of
earnings and public spending. This final section of the thesis, addresses the main research
question: what should be done in Russia to increase fiscal transparency, public
accountability and participation in managing the Russian Stabilization Fund?
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- 64 Despite the skepticism of some international observers concerning the benefits of
setting up an oil fund in a country with an absence of overall budget discipline,104 the
SFRF has achieved several positive results mentioned in the immediate previous section.
Even despite tension between senators and the administration, and given Russian
citizens’ concerns regarding the Fund’s lack of transparency and accountability, the Fund
can be seen in a positive light. This does not mean that Russian society will continue to
tolerate the current situation.
According to official statistics, substantial oil money remains in the Fund despite
the pressure of special interests, which become stronger each day. Therefore, it is not too
late to improve the Fund’s design to guarantee the effective investment strategy,
transparency and accountability of the Fund.
Section 3.1, above, provides general guidelines for any NRF to guarantee
transparency, accountability and public oversight. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 observe the best
practices of accountability for public scrutiny of the funds. Section 4.3 highlights the
fragility of the natural resource fund in Russia, given the poor design, the lack of checks
and balances in its governance, and the weak legislation. Rather then repeating the
recommendations already made, this section will focus on what precisely the Russian
Fund should do in the foreseeable future to improve its design and increase its
transparency and accountability.
4.4.1. Improving the Overall Design of the Fund
It is fundamental to first clarify the SFRF’s mission and objectives. The law
establishing the Fund sets forth that it can be used for the “financing of federal budget
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- 65 deficits when an actual price falls below the base price, and for other purposes.”105 The
first objective (addressing budget deficits) is clear while the second (other purposes) is
not. The second objective should be specified with unmistakable clarity. A more specific
statement of the Fund’s mission would make it possible to determine what expenditure
and investments fall within the Fund’s mandate and which fall outside of it. If the
Russian government and architects of the Fund are not ready to formulate long-term
objectives, a short-term strategy of five years, for example, could help to create a stable
environment around the Fund for at least this period. Otherwise, a smoldering situation,
ripe for social revolution, will surround the reading of the federal budget draft each year.
A diversified investment strategy must be established for the Fund. The decree
states that the Stabilization Fund’s assets can be placed only in a certain form of
securities with governments of several specified foreign states.106 However, the
experience of other natural resource funds demonstrates that combining stocks and bonds
makes it possible to increase returns while keeping risk relatively low. It is important to
develop a long-term strategy for investing in both equity and securities, and to set limits
to the various asset classes. The investment strategy should set benchmark rates of return,
and should indicate what portion of the assets, if any, may be given to external managers
for independent investment.
It appears that no external managers were allowed to manage the Russian Fund’s
assets. The experience of other NRFs teaches that it is wise to delegate a portion of a
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- 66 fund’s principal for management by independent investment agencies. Initially, a portion
of the principal can be limited and then increased gradually, should success be
demonstrated. However, these agencies should be chosen through a process of a
competitive tender.
It must be clearly understood that it is absolutely mandatory that the Fund act as a
professional financial investor. The people’s national endowment must not be wasted,
and most assuredly must not be wasted because of inflation or poor investment
management by governmental agencies. To strengthen a governmental team of investors,
an independent investment consulting body could be created.
These and other new, protective design features for the Fund should be carefully
defined by law and strongly enforced against violation or circumvention. Currently, the
SFRF exists only on the basis of two legal acts that provided a skeletal framework for the
Fund’s establishment. The legal foundation of the Russian Fund must be significantly
strengthened.
4.4.2 Improving Accountability and Public Oversight of the Russian Fund
Until now, there has been neither an internal nor an external auditing policy
established for the Fund. Therefore, an entire auditing system for controlling financial
performance must be developed. According to the best international practice, an
evaluation of a fund’s overall activity can help to guarantee compliance with that fund’s
goals and objectives. However, an independent, external auditor and evaluator should be
hired through a competitive process. Audit and evaluation reports must be open in their
entirety for public scrutiny.

- 67 Lines of accountability for oversight of the Russian Stabilization Fund must be
strengthened significantly:
•

An agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank should
be developed forthwith to set a clear division of responsibilities and a
sophisticated system of checks and balances between them to ensure
accountability of their financial operations.

•

An oversight body or council should be created by the legislature with clear
statements of goals, objectives and responsibilities. This body or council can
function as a “watchdog,” with the aim of contributing to an informed public
debate and sound management of the petroleum wealth. It is crucial for the
success of such a body that representatives from Russian civil society be
included. The law should stipulate procedures for selecting such
representatives to guarantee their presence on the body or council.107

4.4.3 Improving Transparency of the SFRF
Since there is currently no financial data publicly available concerning the SFRF,
quarterly and annual reports beginning for the year 2004 and thereafter should
immediately be made available for public scrutiny and consideration. Ideally, all
information about the Fund should be considered property of the Russian people and be
made available on a website, to all media and upon request.
The best way to make information about the Fund available for the maximum
number of people in a short period of time in Russia is to create and maintain a Fund
website. Initially, special sections, devoted to the Fund, can be designed on websites of
governmental bodies involved with the Fund’s operations: the Ministry of Finance and
107
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- 68 the Central Bank. Ideally, a feedback opportunity should be provided so as to provide
answers to questions posed by the people.108
Outreach activities by the Fund’s staff, such as press-conferences, briefings, and
seminars, as well as public hearings on the Fund’s operations, will be highly appreciated
by Russian citizens and will go a long way towards releasing current tensions.
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- 69 Appendix I. Key Features, Advantages and Disadvantages of Different
…….Types of NRFs

Type of a Key features
fund
Stabilization
fund

Saving fund

Financing
fund

9 Purpose to reduce the
impact of volatile revenue on the
government and the economy.
9 The idea is that the fund
receives money from the budget
when
petroleum
revenue
is
particularly strong and pays out to
the budget when resource revenue is
weak.
9 Inflows and outflows are
typically contingent on whether the
resource revenue or price is “high”
or “low,” compared to some
historical average.
9 Purpose to build up wealth
for future generations.
9 Inflows are typically either
a fixed share of the resource revenue
or a fixed nominal contribution from
the budget.
9 Outflows are typically
discretionary transfers to the budget,
but sometimes are also linked to
specific situations (recessions).
• Purpose to overcome the
design flaw of savings and
stabilization funds relating to
fungibility;
• Act as the government’s
savings account and can serve as
both savings and stabilization fund;
• The budget transfers all
petroleum revenues to the fund and
the fund in turn finances any
remaining budget deficit. Thus the
net inflow into a financing fund is
exactly the overall fiscal balance.

Advantages

Disadvantages

Stabilization funds aim
to
make
budgetary
spending more stable
and
predictable
by
reducing the uncertainty.

9 Suffer from the
fungibility
problem.
Government can make
payments to the fund
when the resource price
is high, but may not
reduce expenditure if
they borrow elsewhere.
9 Another
potential design flaw is
if their rules of inflows
are based on rigid price
thresholds that may
become inappropriate.
This fund is fungible
too. This mean that
assets in the savings
fund do not necessarily
represent
genuine
savings,
since
the
government could be
borrowing. This can
lead to inefficient cash
management.
For such a fund to be a
success, it requires
decision-making
by
government
and
parliament
to
be
informed and long-term.
The challenge grows in
tandem with the size of
the fund.

Savings
funds
can
contribute to long-term
management of natural
resource revenues

Financing
funds
transparently show not
only how much of the
resource revenue the
government is saving,
but also what the
amount saved depends
on the government’s
fiscal policy decisions.

Source: Based on Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste. Public Consultation
Discussion Paper. Ministry of Planning and Finance. October2004, p.22.
www.mopf.gov.tp.

- 70 Appendix 2. Transparency, Accountability and Public Participation Guidelines for
Natural Resource Funds
Part I: Access to Information (Transparency)
N

Generic Transparency Features

1
2
3
4

An annual report published in entirety and is accessible to anyone
Details of revenue in a Fund are accessible to anyone
Details of where and how a Fund is invested are accessible to anyone
Details of expenditure are accessible to anyone
Contracts between the government and petroleum companies and details of
any payments transferred from oil companies to the Government or individuals
or companies are accessible to anyone
Audit reports are accessible to anyone under the Law
All of the information described in points 1-5 is available on the internet
All of the information described in points 1-5 is presented on radio and TV, is
available in prescribed libraries
All the information described in points 1-5 is provided in several languages in
all mediums
All the information is presented in the comprehensible language
A commitment to the principles of the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) is made in Law
Policies, procedures, practices and mechanisms for managing petroleum
revenue are understood by the majority of civil society
There are links from the home page to get any information related to an NRF
Chosen external asset managers
Statement of disclosure policies
Daily Fund position is available through Internet
Possibility of any feedback through the Internet (asking questions, providing
comments, internship opportunities, and so on)

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Fund’s
Scores

Part II: Accountability (Audit Reports)
N

Generic Accountability Features

18
19

A Fund is audited internally (every 6 months)
An NRF is audited independently and externally
An external, independent auditor is chosen through a process of competitive
tender
An external, independent auditor will audit all payments relating to
management of the resources
An external, independent auditor will audit the performance of investments
An external, independent auditor will audit the Fund Managers
An external, independent auditor will certify the calculation of the withdrawal
guideline
Audits will occur at least annually and be provided in an Annual Report

20
21
22
23
24
25

Fund’s
Scores
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Part III: Public Participation (Oversight Mechanisms and Public Input)
N

Generic Public Participation Features

26

An oversight body is established
An oversight body has power of veto over governmental or
parliamentary/legislative decisions related to NRF matters
An oversight body can report to Parliament or other governmental entities at
any time in relation to any aspect of petroleum revenue management
An oversight body’s responsibilities include input into expenditure decisions
An oversight body is not solely appointed by government
An oversight body is widely representative and includes membership from
civil society
An oversight body represents women
Members of the oversight body are remunerated
An oversight body is provided with resources to seek information and advice
An oversight body is provided with resources to seek advice independent of
government
An oversight body is provided with an adequate time frame to provide advice
An oversight body’s responsibilities are well defined
The oversight body’s responsibilities include to protect the interests of both
current and future generations
Civil society has an opportunity to participate in development of a Fund
through an annual forum or public hearings

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Fund’s
Scores

Part IV: Crucial Elements of a Good Design Related to Transparency and Public
Participation
N

Generic Good Design Features

40
41

A NRF is established as an amendment to the Constitution
All of the features of a NRF are defined by Law
Relevant institutions have the capacity to manage the natural resource revenue
(separation of power)
A legislative body, a president, a treasury department, a central bank and
economic development department should have some role in overseeing NRF
operations, and performance evaluation.
A life-span of the Fund is described
A Fund should be professionally managed
A Fund is ‘integrated’ with the budget process
Principles of the Law include protecting the interests of both current and future
generations
Rule changes should be extremely cumbersome (a constitutional amendment
or parliament/legislative super-majority

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Fund’s
Scores
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Comparison of Six NRFs’ Websites
FUNDS’ SCORES

Type of information provided

Alaska

Norway

1. Annual reports published in
entirety
2. Details of revenue:
• Inflows by itself
• Breakdown by source
• Earnings benchmarks
• Return on portfolio

YES

3. Details of where and how a
Fund is invested:
• Companies/indexes in
which the fund holds
assets
• Market value of holdings
in each company
• Methodology of
investment and risk
management
• Chosen external asset
managers
4. Details of expenditure:
• Expenditure by itself
• Breakdown by type
5. Details of any payments
transferred from oil companies
to Government or individuals
6. Reports of external auditor
published in entirety
7. All the information
described in points 1-6 is
available on Internet
8. All the information
described above is presented on
radio and TV, is available in
prescribed libraries
9. All the information
described above is provided in
all official languages in
Internet
10. All the information is
presented in the
comprehensible languagevii
11. A commitment to the
principles of the Extractive
Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) is made in
Law

Venezuela

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan

YES

Canada,
Alberta
YES

NO

YES

NO

YES
YES

YES
NO

YES
YES

YESi
Partlyii

YES
YES

YES
Partlyiii

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

NO
NO

NO
YES

NO
YES

YES

YES

Partlyiv

NO

Partlyv

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO

YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YESvi

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

- 73 12. Policies, procedures,
practices and mechanisms for
managing petroleum revenue
13. There are links from the
home page to get any
information related to an NRF
14. Chosen external asset
managers
15. Statement of disclosure
policies
16. Daily Fund position is
available through Internet
17. Possibility of any feedback
(asking questions, providing
comments and so on)
Total Score:

YES

Partlyviii

YES

Partlyix

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

Partly

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YESx

YESxi

NO

Partlyxii

YESxiii

19.0

16.5

11.5

4.0

13.5

6.5

The six websites can be found at the following URL’s:
Alaska: http://www.apfc.org/.
Norway: http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10001682/bn.html
Canada (Alberta): http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/index.html.
Venezuela: http://www.bcv.org.ve/ifms/ifms.htm.
Azerbaijan: http://www.oilfund.az.
Kazakhstan: http://www.nationalfund.kz
i

The last inflow information available is for 2002.
The information is not complete and available until 2002.
iii
The information is not complete. The breakdown provided is by type of payment (i.e. VAT, royalty) but
not by company which made the payment.
iv
It has a breakdown by type of market (US, Canadian, Non-American) and by type of asset, but it does not
name companies.
v
It has an aggregated breakdown by type of financial institutions, but it does not name them.
vi
However, the last available report is for 2003 fiscal year.
vii
We would prefer not to estimate the level of funds websites comprehensiveness it in this paper. Probably,
it should be additional criteria than just our personal judgment.
viii
Unlike the resource funds in Alaska, Alberta, and Venezuela, Norway’s SPF does not specify what share
of oil revenues are to be deposited each year. Deposits are determined annually by the legislature; they
consist of net oil revenues after the non-oil budget deficit has been covered.
ix
They provide general rules in the Law, but they do not support it by any additional regulations.
x
Anyone can ask a question; however it goes not to fund’s staff directly, but to the Ministry’s of Finance
web desk.
xi
It goes to the general information service for the Ministry of Finance as with the Norwegian Fund.
xii
They provide the contact information on the website, but it does not say that any questions will be
answered.
xiii
It also goes to the general information service for the Ministry of Finance.
ii
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Lines of Accountability in Oversight of Norway’s State Petroleum Fund

Parliament
Determines deposits to the Fund
annually
General Oversight the SPR

Norges Bank
Supervisory
Council
Appointed by
parliament to
oversee SPF

Advisory
Council on
Ethics

Ministry of Finance

Consult the Ministry
on ethical issues

Strategic investment decisions

Investment
Strategy
Council

Oversees Bank’s management
of the Fund

Assist the Ministry
with investment
strategy

Auditor
General
Conduct annual
audit and submits to
the Council

External Auditor

Norges Bank (Central Bank)
Risk management/risk control,
Accounting
Reporting
Reports to Ministry of Finance

Manag
ement
Team

Petroleum
Insurance
Fund
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Lines of Accountability in Oversight the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan

President
Controls the SOFAZ, appoints the Executive Director and members of the
Supervisory Council

Supervisory Council
•

External Audit
•

Reviews SOFAZ’s annual
report and audit’s report, and
proposed budget for SOFAZ.
Reports to the president

Executive Director of SOFAZ
•
•
•
•

Exercises operational management
Submit quarterly and annual reports
Estimates of operational expenses to the president
Cooperates with auditor selected by the president

Investment Board
Consults the Director with
investment strategy
Consists of the executive director
and senior officials of relevant
SOFAZ departments
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Appendix 6
Lines of Accountability in Oversight of Russian Stabilization Fund
Parliament (Duma)
Determines spending strategy of
the Fund as a part of the federal
budget law
General Oversight of the SPR

Ministry of Finance
Strategic investment
decisions

Oversees Bank’s
management of the Fund

Auditing
Chamber
Conduct annual
audit and submits to
the Duma (a project)

External Auditor (it does
not exist yet, but there is a plan
to create.

Central Bank of Russian
Federation
Risk management/risk control,
Accounting
Reporting
Reports to the Ministry of Finance
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